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Abstract 
Otley et al. (1995) allege management accounting has become narrow in its focus 
and believe research is needed in broader areas. The areas of performance 
measurement and control have been suggested as a topic which warrants further 
management accounting research (Otley et al., 1995). 
Organisations are facing a very different environment to that of 20 years ago. 
Management accounting has failed to keep pace with these changes when designing 
management control systems (Otley, et al., 1995). Furthermore: 
"Resesarch from the UK and USA has shown that [performance 
measurement and control] is an area financial directors are the least satisfied 
with" (Haq, 1995, p. 20) . . 
The culture of a country must be considered when developing a compensation 
system. However, there has been a dearth of research on the topic of pay for 
performance in a New Zealand context and the decentralisation of the remuneration 
functions to individual business units. 
Consequently a case study was conducted at Business Unit A of the Christchurch 
City Council. This examined the process followed by Business Unit A to develop 
and implement a pay for performance system for their Unit. 
Prior to this research, these aspects of design and implementation have not been 
addressed in a New Zealand context. Despite the human bias possible when 
conducting case studies' and other limitations, the body of knowledge surrounding 
pay for performance has been expanded and areas for future research recommended. 
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"The important thing is not to stop questioning .... One cannot help but be in 
awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the 
marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to 
comprehend a little of this mystery every day" 
Einstein (1879-1953) 
Otley et al. (1995) allege management accounting has become naiTow in its focus 
and believe· research is needed in broader areas. The areas of performance 
measurement and control have been suggested as topics which warrant further 
management accounting research (Otley et al., 1995). 
Organisations are facing a very different environment to that of 20 years ago. 
Management accounting has failed to keep pace with these changes when designing 
management control systems (Otley, et al., 1995). Furthermore: 
"Resesarch from the UK and USA has shown that [performance 
measurement and control] is an area financial directors are the least satisfied 
with" (Haq, 1995, p. 20). 
As wages are a large cost to an organisation, it is particularly imp01iant that this area 
is investigated. Management accountants have the skills to design compensation 
systems and need to take a more active role than they have in the past (Tang et al., 
1987). 
Drury and Tayles (1995) note that "information about management accounting 
practices is ... almost all ... anecdotal" (p. 267). Much of the current literature in the 
area of pay for performance originates from consultants working in the field of 
human resources, and managers of companies who have been examining and 
changing their compensation systems. 
Employees, of a large company, were surveyed to assess their reaction to the 
2 Introduction 
implementation of a performance based pay plan (Lowery et al., 1996). It was found 
the overall reaction to the plan was very positive. However, there were some 
.. 
concerns with regard to the implementation aspect of the pay for performance plan. 
There has been a deaiih of case study research on the topic of pay for performance, 
particularly in a New Zealand context. Fmihermore, the implications of 
decentralising remuneration issues to individual business units have not been 
addressed. Hence, the resemch objective of this thesis is: 
To examine the design and implementation of a pay for performance system in a 
New Zealand public sector organisation. 
Consequently a case study has been conducted at Business Unit A of the 
Christchurch City Council. This examined the process followed by Business Unit A 
to develop and attempt to implement a pay for performance system. 
This thesis commences with a review of the literature surrounding pay for 
performance. Chapter 2 provides context for this research and examines history, 
theories of motivation, and the advantages and disadvantages of pay for performance 
systems. Chapter 3 offers suggestions to ensure the effective design and 
implementation of a system. The case study method was utilised in this research and 
is discussed in Chapter 4. The findings illustrate the complex nature of design and 
implementation of a pay for performance system and are presented in Chapter 5. 
These findings must be read in conjunction with the limitations of this resemch. 
Limitations and suggestions for further research are presented in Chapter 6 and are 
followed by concluding observations in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 2 
Pay for Performance and the 
Management Control Process 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"An important aspect of managerial control in organisations is motivating 
managers and employees to pursue the organisation's interests as they 
undertake their daily tasks" (Institute of Chartered Accountants of New 
Zealand, 1997, p. 5). 
Otley et al. (1995) believe management accounting has become narrow in its focus 
and allege research• is needed in broader areas. The areas of performance 
measurement and control have been suggested as topics which warrant further 
management accounting research (Otley et al., 1995). Furthermore, management 
accountants have the skills to design compensation systems and need to take a more 
active role than they have in the past (Tang et al., 1987). 
Pay for performance can be used as a management control tool to achieve goal 
congruence and motivate an organisation's employees. This chapter defines pay for 
performance and reviews its historical background. This is followed by a discussion 
of the theory that supports pay for performance. Finally, the advantages and 
disadvantages of these systems are examined. 
2. DEFINITION OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
A compensation package will typically include a combination of base salary, short 
and long-term incentives1, benefits, and perquisites (Lew and Kolodzief, 1993). 
Benefits include items such as medical, life insurance and pension plans, and 
perquisites include use of a company car, club memberships, and cellular telephones 
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(Lew and Kolodzief, 1993). 
Incentives are an important part of a well trained, motivated workforce. This is 
imperative to success in today's highly competitive business environment 
(Wakefield, 1994). Incentive pay may be dependent on the performance of an 
individual, a team or division, the organisation, or a combination of them all. 
Consequently this type of payment is known as pay for performance. Pay for 
performance is also known as performance-based pay (Berger and Moyer, 1991), 
performance-related pay (Fowler, 1988), and variable pay (Weiss~ 1990)2. 
In order to understand pay for performance and the role it plays in an organisation, 
one must observe the organisation as a whole. An integral part of any organisation is 
a management control system. A management control system is "a tool to aid 
management in moving an organization towards its strategic objectives" (Anthony 
and Govindarajan, 1995, p. 10). Its central role is to promote goal congruence 
between employee and organisational goals (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995). A 
number of interrelated components make up a management control system (Rotch, 
1993; Teall, 1992). The key components are illustrated in Figure 2-1 (page 6). 
One management control system is a performance management system. Performance 
management is defined as: 
"the mission and strategy that align the organization's reward system and 
the productive capacity of its employees with the organization's vision and 
strategic business plan. Under this definition, performance management 
also: 
• reinforces the organization's value system; 
• provides for clear understanding of expectations; 
• rewards only those who deserve rewards; 
• offers opportunitie~ for growth and development (not limited to 
promotions); 
• recognizes the individual needs and aspirations of employees; 
• has congruency with staffing plans to provide the correct number of 
employees with the right skill/experience mix; 
1 Both financial and non-financial. 
2To aid consistency, the term pay for performance will be substituted for the other terms throughout this research. Variable pay 
may also refer to a type of pay for performance where a percentage of base pay is at risk and will be earnt only if targets 
are met (Giblin and Kelley, 1994). 
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• has enough flexibility to fit various structures and organization 
alignments while accepting changes. in the number of managerial levels 
and the proper degree of decentralization; and 
• provides recognition for achievement of the organization's objectives" 
(Stewart 1993, pp. 20-21). 
This is illustrated in Figure 2-2 (page 6). 
Figure 2-1 - Key Components of a Management Control System 
(Rotch, 1993, p. 192) 
Monitoring activities 
Measuring performance 




Organization structure " 





Rewards and incentives 
Producing change 
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Within the framework of a performance management system, an organisation may 
decide to include some form of pay for performance. This is only part of a 
performance management system, and most often involves linking all or part of an 
employees remuneration to the achievement of predetermined goals, as assessed 
through performance appraisal (Brough, 1994). 
Pay for performance is defined as: 
"a method of setting very specific performance objectives for individual 
employees in a company and tying a substantial portion of an employee's 
compensation to the successful achievement of those objectives" (Geske, 
1989, p. 27). 
Kinnie and Lowe (1990) believe a pay for performance scheme: 
"attempt[s] to relate some propositions of pay not just to individual output 
but also to other indicators of performance such as quality, flexibility, 
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Figure 2-2 - Performance Managing 








Silburt (1987) maintains pay for performance is "a form of compensation that gives 
employees attractive incentives to work harder and more effectively" (p. 72). 
Whereas, Schuler and Youngblood (1986) simply state that pay for performance 
systems "relate pay to performance" (p. 327). 
The term pay for performance encompasses a multitude of different systems, that are 
often difficult to distinguish between (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991). For this 
reason they are collectively referred to as perfom1ance pay systems, or pay for 
performance (Sheffield Con~ulting Group, 1997). These schemes may be based on 
team or individual performance, or many include elements of both.3 
INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS 
Individual pay for performance systems are appropriate when a 'job is well defined 
and the performance characteristics are both well delineated and assessable" 
3 These systems are not always considered to be 'true' pay for performance systems. Often this is dependant on the structure 
and design ofa system (McGinty and Hanke, 1989; Sahl, 1994a; Tang et al., 1987). 
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(Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991, p. 31 ). If individual incentives are used when 
teamwork is important to the business' success, this will have a detrimental effect on 
organisational performance (Gandossy and Scheffel, 1995). Examples of individual 
pay for performance systems include: 
i) Pay for knowledge4: Pay for knowledge rewards an employee for the ability to 
perform a task or skill (Krajci, 1990). These types of systems are particularly 
suited to technical professions (Franklin, 1988), and in those positions where 
cross training is important (Morris, 1996). 
ii) Competency based pay: Competency based pay measures "sets of employee 
skills and their related outcomes under the banner of a competency" (Laymon, 
1996, p. 35). 
iii) Maturity curve compensation: When an organisation utilises a maturity curve 
compensation system "pay varies with discipline, degree, and years of 
experience" (Mahoney, 1989, p. 340) . . 
iv) Merit pay: Under a merit pay system increases in base pay are determined by an 
individual's performance (Sullivan, 1988). 
v) Variable pay: With this system a percentage of base pay is at risk and will be 
earnt only if targets are met (Giblin and Kelley, 1994). 
GROUP SYSTEMS 
Group incentive systems are: 
"appropriate under conditions where direct superv1s1on is not readily 
feasible, exact measurement of individual work performance is difficult, and 
where teamwork and co-operation are essential to success" (Applebaum and 
Shapiro, 1991, p. ~4). 
Further, when n01Hnanagement employees have a measurable effect on an 
organisation's success group incentives will be beneficial (Chingos and Lind, 1990). 
Examples of group pay for performance systems include: 
i) Team incentives: A group of employees receive rewards based on the 
achievement of predetermined team goals (Gross and Bacher, 1989). 
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ii) Stock option plans: An employee is given the right to purchase company shares 
for a set price at a future date (MacDonald, 1988). 
iii) Profit-sharing: Employees receive a bonus based on the organisation's profit 
(Anonymous, 1995). 
iv) Gain-sharing plans: A formula is used to calculate employees share of financial 
gains due to improved performance (Harris, 1996; Parnell, 1991). The plans are 
productivity, quality and customer service (Anonymous, 1996a; Perry, 1988). 
The difference between gain-sharing and profit-sharing is the former generally 
has goals related to productivity rather than profit (Anonymous, l 996a). 
INDIVIDUAL OR TEAM SYSTEMS 
There are some pay for performance plans that may be either individual or team 
based, depending on the objective of the plan. Examples include: 
. 
i) Lump sum payments or bonuses: Employees are given a lump sum payment in 
lieu of an increase in salary (Harris, 1996). This does not become part of base 
salary (Perry, 1988). 
ii) Incentive pay plans: An incentive payment is "based on achievement of 
specific individual, divisional, or company-wide goals" (Rich and Florin-Thuma, 
1990, p. 17). 
Organisations that have adopted a pay for performance system may believe they are 
paying their employees based on performance, however, if there is little 
differentiation between employees in the same department, they are paying 
"endurance-based compensation"5 (McSparran, 1993, p. 119; McGinty and Hanke, 
1989). Employees are therefore being paid for "attendance instead of performance" 
(Muczyk, 1988, p. 233). When there is little differentiation between employees, this 
practice creates an environment where employees feel they are entitled to increases in 
pay regardless of performance (Case, 1996; McSparran, 1993; Stewart et al., 1993). 
4 Also known as skill based pay (Krajci, 1990). 
5 Where employees arc paid according to the length of employment with the organisation. 
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In such an environment employees are not convinced of the link between their pay 
and their performance (Lowery et al., 1996; McGinty and Hanke, 1989; Sullivan, 
1'988; Wilkerson, 1995). This is often exacerbated by organisations keeping 
compensation information secret. The employee is then "asked to accept as an article 
of faith that pay and performance are related" (Lawler, 1981, p. 50). As Applebaum 
and Shapiro (1991) note "the secrecy of pay is related to perceived inequity" (p. 33). 
Pay for performance must be an integral part of the entire management process, and: 
"must be linked to the economic and operational realities of the enterprise. 
Top pay and benefits are not employee rights or entitlements. They are 
contingencies - contingent, ultimately, upon the enterprise's long-term 
economic success" (p. 42). 
The traditional method of paying employees must be replaced with a new effective 
approach to remuneration (Giblin and Kelley, 1994). However, pay for performance 
is not a new phenomenon. It has a lengthy history that dates back to circa 18th 
century. 
3. HISTORY OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
"Although the use of incentives to stimulate performance occurs throughout 
history, for the greater part of recorded history the use of incentives was 
intuitive, reflecting individual responses to the immediate requirements of 
specific situations, rather than a natural outcome of generally held 
theoretical propositions" (Peach and Wren, 1992, p. 22). 
The Co~e of Hammurabi6 (circa 18th century B.C.) provides the earliest reference to 
incentives (Peach and Wren, 1992). It refers to travelling merchants who were 
agents for people in the cities. The travelling merchants made no profit until they 
doubled their employers investment. Simplistic incentives schemes such as this 
continued throughout the Middle Ages7, usually in the form of a piece rate system8• 
6 Hammurabi was the sixth King of Babylon. His code was a collection of Babylonian laws. 
7 The Middle Ages generally refers to the period commencing with the fall of the Western Roman Empire (in the 5th century), 
and ending in the 16th century with the Renaissance (The Macmillan Encyclopaedia, 1986). 
8 Employees paid on a piece rate system are paid per unit of output (The Macmillan Encyclopedia, 1986). 
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During the Industrial Revolution9, incentive schemes became much more complex. 
Efforts to improve productivity were resisted by employees as the schemes were 
characterised by subjective performance standards and rate cutting 10• 
By the end of this era, economists had developed a theory of wages' 1 and Frederick 
Taylor and other engineers were responding to the disadvantages of subjective 
performance standards. Taylor (1911) 12 developed standards for work that were more 
objective, based partially on time study, and had an immense influence on modern 
incentive plans. As Peach and Wren (1992) note, "[t]he era of sdentific management 
spawned a litany of incentive plans, many attributable to disciples of Taylor" (Peach 
and Wren, 1992, p. 16). 
From the 1920s, incentives were being challenged by social scientists who believed 
factors such as human relations and employee motives should be taken into 
consideration when attempting to motivate employees. The combination of 
economic and social theory led behavioral scientists to develop motivation theories 
such as expectancy and equity theory 13 (Peach and Wren, 1992). 
For much of the 1970s, compensation design focused on entitlements. It was not 
until the 1980s that organisations began to view compensation systems as an 
important part of the management process (Young, 1990). Organisations were 
stmiing to recognise the importance of the design of compensation systems, become 
more aware ?f the role incentives can play, and apply these elements to more sectors 
within their organisation (Young, 1990). 
Pay for performance was initially applied to executives and top management. This is 
gradually being extended to a larger proportion of an organisation's employees, and 
9 The Industrial Revolution refers to the transformation of countries from agricultural to industrial economies. This process 
commenced in approximately I 750 (The Macmillan Encyclopaedia, 1986). 
111 Rate cutting is when the rate paid per unit is reduced when productivity increases (Peach and Wren, 1992). 
11 The Economic man [sic] assumption asserts that "monetary incentives brought out the best in people and that they would 
work harder to get more" (Peach and Wren, 1992, p. 10). The theory of marginal productivity states "an employer will 
hire until the wages paid to the last worker hired equals the value of production contributed by that worker" (Peach and 
Wren, 1992, p. 11). 
12 Cited in Peach and Wren (1992). 
13 These theories will be defined in a later section. 
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in some organisations to the entire workforce (Banker et al., 1996; Geske, 1989; 
Proctor et al., 1993; Ross, 1988). 
Middle managers in particular have been the subject of discussion. Ross (1988) 
contends middle managers should be included in pay for performance systems as 
they: 
"have a very significant effect on company performance because they 
control many day-to-day operations and their cumulative decisions greatly 
affect profits. They implement strategic business objectives" (p. 34). 
Weiss (1990) believes few middle managers are included in such plans because of 
the difficulty in coming up with objective measures of performance. Whereas, 
Chingos and Lind (1990) state middle managers are routinely included in pay for 
performance plans. 
"Research has supported the fact that it is increasingly important to motivate 
indirect/support people to improve their productivity. It is vital that 
management visibly recognise that such people are essential and 
significantly contribute to the organisation's profitability (Applebaum and 
Shapiro, 1991, .p. 38). 
Applebaum and Shapiro (1991) believe all employees should have the opportunity to 
benefit from pay for performance. However, when Italian motor vehicle company 
Fiat implemented their pay for performance system, they decided not to extend it 
lower into the management hierarchy. They believed the benefits of extending the 
system to lower levels of management would have been negated by the dramatic 
increase. in administration and incentive costs (Merchant and Riccaboni, 1990). 
Milkovich (1988) believes: 
"certain employee groups may be more (or less) critical to the success of the 
organization than others, it follows that their reward systems become an 
important part of implementing the organizations business strategy" 
(p. 266). 
It is important to target those that influence an organisation's performance, or the 
scheme may become too expensive to sustain (Anonymous, 1988). However, there 
are a number of reasons an organisation may adopt pay for performance and push the 
schemes into the lower levels of the organisation (Fowler, 1988). These include: 
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• Organisations which are trying to achieve a change of culture see 
performance pay as one of the means of changing employee attitudes. It 
makes little sense, therefore, to restrict these pay schemes to managerial 
staff - all staff need to be influenced by a new emphasis on the value of 
high individual and team performance14 • 
• A weakening of trade union power in some organisations has made it 
possible to extend performance pay into sectors of the workforce where 
in previous years such developments might well have resulted in 
industrial action. Trade unions, while still opposed in principle to 
individual merit appraisal, are slowly adopting a more pragmatic 
approach. 
• In some organisations, particularly in the public sector, performance pay 
is seen as a means of achieving more attractive and competitive salary 
levels. Most public bodies are experiencing severe recruitment and 
retention problems across the whole white-collar professional sector. If 
performance pay is used to make salaries more attractive, it has to be 
applied across all these jobs and not be restricted to managerial staff 
(Fowler, 1988, pp. 32-33). 
Smith (1992) believes that organisations should not necessarily utilise centralised 
remuneration systems. R.ather, individual units should be responsible for their own 
remuneration issues. This approach to remuneration is compatible with the 
decentralised structures where managers have considerable autonomy (Smith, 1992). 
It will work effectively when there are clear lines of authority within business units. 
Central human resources staff will provide guidance to the managers making the 
decisions rather than issuing directives on remuneration issues (Smith, 1992). 
Devolution of authority of the remuneration functions to individual business units, 
has not been widely researched. The literature fails to rep01i whether organisations 
that take this approach to remuneration design, face distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. Further research in this area is needed. 
Pay for performance was initially more prevalent in the private sector. However, 
public sector organisations are increasingly adopting variations of pay for 
performance (Fowler, 1988). The movement of pay for performance into the public 
sector could not have occurred without a radical change in the mindset of the affected 
organisations (Fowler, 1988). Previously, public sector remuneration philosophy had 
been (and still is in some situations) if employees are rewarded equally, then they are 
1
' The influence of culture on performance based pay is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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rewarded equitably (Murray and Kuffel, 1978). As Fowler (1988) notes "[t]o 
identify some employees as better than others implied a variability of service which 
was inconsistent with the principle of impersonal uniformity" (p. 32). It is important 
that pay for performance systems are not used as a substitute for management 
(Gandossy and Scheffel, 1995), for in essence this will merely delay the inevitable 
need for change in these areas (Fuller-Love and Scapens, 1997). 
In the mid 1980s, New Zealand commenced a period of radical public sector reform. 
The New Zealand model of public management adopted a number of policies in the 
mid 1990s concerning performance. The following policies are an example of those 
related to performance and illustrate the change in mindset the public sector needed 
to introduce pay for performance: 
• A strong emphasis on the use of incentives to enhance performance, at both 
the institutional and the individual level (e.g. short-term employment 
contracts, performance-based remuneration systems, promotion systems, 
etc.). 
• The develop1~ent of integrated and relatively sophisticated strategic 
planning and performance management systems throughout the public 
sector. Key elements include the specification by ministers of strategic 
result areas and key result areas and the integration of these into [Chief 
Executive's] performance agreements and departmental purchase 
agreements (Boston et al., 1996, p. 5). 
Fletcher Challenge Limited's human resource manager, Rob Keen15, believes tying 
executives pay to performance is the way of the future. The introduction (or 
resurrection) of pay for performance systems in New Zealand is a reflection of two 
factors. First, New Zealand companies are now competing in the global market for 
top quality management (MacAlister, 1994; Muczyk, 1988); and second they are 
being influenced by management practices of the foreign companies which are 
buying into them (MacAlister, 1994). Greg Milano, Vice President of Stem 
Stewart16, believes incentive schemes in New Zealand are a "natural evolution of 
New Zealand's business world since the deregulation and privatisation of the 1980s" 
(MacAlister, 1994, p. 43). The use of pay for performance systems is widespread in 
15 Cited in MacAlister (1994), not referenced. 
16 Cited in MacAlister (1994), not referenced. 
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both the public and private sectors of New Zealand. 67% of organisations have 
incentive systems (Watson Wyatt, 1996 11). They feature strongly m 
Telec.ommunications/Electronics/IT (91 %) and Pharmaceutical/Chemical sectors 
(95%). Pay for performance systems are also featured more in larger organisations. 
35% of organisations with less than 50 employees, and 100% of organisations with 
greater than 3000 employees, have a pay for performance system. The popularity of 
these systems provides indirect support for the two main motivational theories that 
underly pay for performance. 
4. THEORIES OF MOTIVATION 
Equity and expectancy theories are the foundations upon which the concept of pay 
for performance is built (McGinty and Hanke, 1989; Sullivan, 1988). Equity theory 
holds that employees wish to be equitably treated by their employers. When their 
compensation is not perceived to be comparable to the effort expended, action is 
taken to restore equity. :rlms employees may increase or decrease their effort (or 
performance) to match their compensation (Sullivan, 1988). 
Expectancy theory posits an employee is motivated to perform a task (if they believe 
they are capable), when offered a reward that is commensurate with the effort 
expended and the reward is perceived as valuable (McGinty and Hanke, 1989; Smith 
et al., 1987). Therefore, if an organisation does not pay employees for their 
performance-, equity and expectancy theory states an employee's performance will 
not be maximised (Lowery et al., 1996). 
These motivational theories dominate the literature, however they are not 
unanimously supported. Kohn (1993) believes "the failure of any given incentive 
program is due less to a glitch in that program than to the inadequacy of the 
psychological assumptions that ground all such plans" (p. 54). Kohn (1993) adds 
intrinsic motivation18 is the factor on which organisations should concentrate in order 
to improve perfoimance. However, Banker et al. (1996) note: 
17 Cited in Cotton ( 1997). 
18 Where one is motivated by the challenge and enjoyment of a position (Stewart et al., 1993). 
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"it would be naive to assert that incentives always improve 
performance .... in performing a task that subjects find intrinsically 
interesting, introduction of monetary incentives decreases subsequent 
interest and performance because incentives are experienced as controlling 
and they frequently convey a sense of incompetence" (p. 203). 
15 
This view is supported by Awasthi and Pratt (1990) 19, who report, "provision of 
monetary incentives does not result in improved performance for subjects with low 
intuitive and perceptual abilities to perform a complex task" (Banker et al., 1996, 
p. 203). However, extrinsic incentives are not necessarily perceived as controlling 
(Stewart et al., 1993). While intrinsic rewards are motivating, they do not always 
exist, and can not always be created (Stewart et al., 1993). Further, if employees are 
not rewarded for exemplary performance "mediocrity will become widespread unless 
the work is intrinsically satisfying" (Murray and Kuffel, 1978, p. 172). 
Expectancy and equity theories dominate the motivational literature. The theory that 
intrinsic rewards are stronger motivators than extrinsic rewards is not widely 
accepted (Applebauip. and Shapiro, 1991). The motivational benefits of pay for 
performance plans are further reflected in the many advantages of introducing these 
systems. 
5. ADV ANT AGES OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
Pay for performance can be an effective management tool (Berger and Moyer, 1991; 
Bice, 1990). It can be used to influence the organisation, its employees and its 
customers. It has been heralded as the "most direct technique available to capitalize 
on the value for money" (Parnell, 1991, p. 8). A pay for performance system can do 
this by focusing employees on what is impo1iant to the organisation, increasing the 
organisation's flexibility, improving organisational performance, and aiding in the 
management of employees. 
19 Cited in Banker et al. (1996). 
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5.1.Flexibility 
An or.ganisation with a pay for performance system will have the increased flexibility 
that today's environment demands (Gandossy and Scheffel 1995; Turner, 1996). As 
Rich and Florin-Thuma (1990) note: 
"Organizations are understandably reluctant to continue increasing fixed 
compensation in this new business environment. As an alternative, 
companies are turning to variable pay programs, which provide employees 
with financial growth without adding to fixed labor costs" (p. 16). 
Instead of the traditional fixed compensation and its accompanying annual increase, 
an organisation's compensation is able to more closely follow organisational 
performance (Turner, 1996), individual performance (Anonymous, 1996b; Turner, 
1996) and the external market (Anonymous, l 996b ). With the advent of broad 
banding20 an increase in pay can be given without the traditional promotion (Kerr, 
1996). Pay for performance systems also reduce internal and external influences 
such as the 'going rate' ~nd union involvement in pay negotiations (Proctor et al., 
1993). 
An effective pay for performance system enables an organisation to change direction 
rapidly (Geske, 1989). Geske (1989) further notes, 
"[a] prime way to gain flexibility in successfully dealing with this new 
world is through development of an effective compensation program, one 
which leads management and the company as a whole in the direction of 
strategic goals" (p. 27). 
5.2.Focus on Strategic Objectives 
A successful pay for performance system will focus employees on the strategic 
objectives of an organisation, providing the employees performance objectives are 
aligned with the company's strategic objectives (Geske, 1989; Laabs, 1996). It 
brings the strategic objectives of an organisation to the attention of those who have 
the ability to influence its success (Geske, 1989; Laabs, 1996; Pederson and 
Lidgerding, 1995). A pay for performance system is "a tool in the implementation of 
211 Broad salary bands have been introduced in response to the flatter management hierarchies now prevalent in most businesses. 
This means a manager may stay in one broad salary band, ranging from, for instance, $50,000 to $100,000, for the duration 
of their career (Labich, 1992). 
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the [organisation's] business strategies" (Ross, 1988, p. 35). If well designed it can 
have a strong impact on organisational performance21 • 
5.3.0rganisational Performance 
"A control system, with management incentives, that is designed to match 
the characteristics of the global corporation should be a key element in 
achieving the superior competitive position possible from using a global 
strategy" (Dyment, 1987, p. 26). 
Many companies believe their pay for performance systems increase performance, 
however they do not monitor results to find if this is true (O'Connor, 1994). Hay 
Consultants22 has found a positive correlation between an organisation's financial 
performance and the incidence of pay for performance (Bice, 1990). Improvements 
in productivity and profitability are a bi-product of the cultural change that a pay for 
performance system engenders (Ross, 1988)23 • Further, such a system can help the 
company move towards an "achievement-oriented" environment (Ross, 1988, p. 35). 
Additional evidence l;ias been gained from KPMG Peat Marwick (1993)24 who found 
"a financial company's ability to achieve high performance may be directly related to 
its emphasis on performance-based compensation and long-term incentives" 
(Anonymous, 1994, p. 6). However, while a pay for performance system may not 
immediately reduce costs or improve profits, the intention is to have a beneficial long 
term effect on the organisation's success (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). 
Improvements in productivity and performance are more likely under a plan that has 
been well designed, and has included ample training and employee involvement 
(Stewart et al., 1993). Along with improved financial performance and productivity, 
a pay for performance system can also have the effect of: improving business 
awareness (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990), increasing customer satisfaction (Rigg, 1992), 
improving quality (Anonymous, 1995; Berger and Moyer, 1991), and increasing cost 
21 Design issues are addressed in Chapter 3. 
22 Cited in Bice (1990), not referenced. 
23 Culture and pay for performance will be covered in Chapter 3. 
24 Cited in Anonymous (1994), incomplete reference. 
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efficiency (Berger and Moyer, 1991; Gross and Bacher, 1993; Rigg, 1992; Ross, 
1988). 
A pay for performance system also has beneficial effects on an organisation's 
communication systems (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990; Zemke, 1985). Inadequacies are 
highlighted quickly, as pay for performance is heavily reliant on efficient and 
effective communication at all levels of the organisation (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). 
Organisations therefore tend to adopt "more open and accountable" management 
practices (Anonymous, l 996b, p. S6). This has beneficial effects on the management 
of employees. 
5.4.Management of Employees 
Organisations with pay for performance systems attract and retain talented 
employees (Banker et al., 1996; Geske, 1989; McGinty and Hanke, 1989; Ross, 
1988). Potential employees who are comfortable with risk are more likely to be 
attracted to organisations 'with pay for performance systems (Lederer and Weinberg, 
1996). Conversely, existing employees who are not performing are induced to lift 
their performance or leave the organisation (Banker et al., 1996; Postrel, 1993). 
A good pay for performance system enables an organisation to identify which of their 
employees are performing and rewards them appropriately (Lederer and Weinberg, 
1996; Ross, 1988). Similarly, underperformers can be identified and reduced 
(Postrel, 1993; Ross, 1988; Sink and Sahl, 1995). This has the effect of improving 
the quality of the employee mix (Parnell, 1991 ), reducing voluntary turnover 
(Lowery et al., 1995; Parnell, 1991), and decreasing absenteeism (Lowery et al., 
1995; Parnell, 1991). 
Further, evidence shows employees contribute more ideas to improve work practices 
when pay for performance systems are introduced (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). 
Training requirements are more easily identified when a pay for performance system 
is implemented (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990; Zemke, 1985), as problem areas are 
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identified at each appraisal, and possibly earlier depending on the performance 
management system25 • 
.. 
Pay for performance also prompts favourable behavioural consequences. Employees 
recognise employers are aware of their efforts and their performance will be 
rewarded appropriately (Anonymous, 1995). A well-designed pay for performance 
system means employees will understand what is expected of them. This engenders 
improved commitment from employees (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990), increased job 
satisfaction (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990; Lowery et al., 1995; Parnell, 1991), and 
increased pay satisfaction (Lowery et al., 1995). 
6. DISADVANTAGES OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
It is important that: 
"all of the implications of the program, both positive and negative are 
clearly understood by the major decision-makers of the organization. (No 
one should have to say, "I never thought it would turn out like this,")" 
(Young, 1990, p. 349 [emphasis added]). 
The contention, that pay for performance systems improve the ability of an 
organisation to adapt to a complex and ever changing environment, has been 
challenged. It has been suggested that pay for performance is outdated (Carnell, 
1993) and has failed to keep pace with the complex nature of the global market 
(Wilkerson, 1995). Furthermore, having salary and performance evaluation based on 
past performance is "inconsistent with the reengineered environment of a customer-
focussed organization" (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 40). Major criticisms stem from 
problems with the performance management process, union reaction, and adverse 
effects on teamwork. 
6.1.Performance Management 
Most pay for performance systems will include the setting of goals, how to measure 
progress towards the goals, and appraisal of actual performance. Each of these steps 
in a performance management system presents their own particular problems. 
25 Training is addressed in a later section. 
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6.1.1. Goals 
"The setting of precise and meaningful objectives is crucial to [performance 
related pay] schemes and many of the criticisms of them stem from a failure 
in that process" (Brough, 1994, p. 24). 
Establishing effective objectives that encompass the main aspects of each employee's 
position is difficult (Brough, 1994). It is therefore not surprising that there is often 
some question as to the quality of goals (Lowery et al., 1996). Quality of goals is 
compromised when they are vague or unrealistic (Brough, 1994), or when individual 
objectives are utilised when group ones would be more appropriate (Meehan, 1992). 
Another factor which reduces the effectiveness of pay for performance is when goals 
are "set autocratically and measured subjectively" (Rondeau, 1992, p. 13). 
The quantity of the goals is also imp01iant. There are often too many objectives and 
this has the result of obfuscating those which are particularly important to the 
organisation (Meehan, 1992). If goals are ineffective, this will have a flow on effect 
that will affect performance measurement and the subsequent performance appraisal. 
6.1.2. Performance Measurement 
Development of performance criteria that explicitly identify the behaviour that will 
be rewarded is very difficult (Deming, 1986; Lowery et al., 1996; Parnell, 1991). 
Consequently performance measures are often subjective (Balkin, 1989; O'Connor, 
1994), unclear (O'Connor, 1994), and in some cases the wrong performance 
measures are used (Minken, 1987). This means that an organisation is unable to 
draw accurate distinctions between an employee's performance and therefore cannot 
justify the differences in pay (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991 ). Part of this difficulty 
stems from organisations . having one system for measuring and rewarding 
performance of a group of varied employees, who play vastly different roles within 
an organisation (Cumming, 1988). 
There has been ·substantial debate as to the most appropriate means of gauging 
performance (Young, 1990). Public Service Association researcher, Bruce Fleury26 
26 Cited in O'Connor (1994), not referenced. 
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believes "effort is not measurable. Aspects of output of effort are measurable, but the 
measures are crude" (O'Connor, 1994, p. 26) . 
.. 
Performance management can pose a particular problem in the public sector. As 
Brough (1994) states: 
"since objectives must ... be measurable [to be useful], it leads to an 
overemphasis on the measurable aspects of the job. This is especially a 
problem in the public sector, where it may result in a deterioration in overall 
service" (p. 24). 
Deming (1986) further notes the only verifiable measure is short term. Difficulties in 
measuring the performance of an employee often contributes to the criticisms of 
performance appraisals. 
6.1.3. Performance Appraisal 
"It is unlikely that any managerial problem has so successfully resisted 
solution than arriving at an acceptable, useful and valid method for 
appraising performance" (Henderson, 1981, p. 8)27• 
Pay for performance is contingent upon employees believing there is a link between 
their performance and their rewards. In order to establish this connection, an 
organisation must have a reliable performance appraisal (Muczyk, 1988). However, 
a major problem with pay for performance systems are the performance appraisals 
(Sullivan, 1988). "At its worst it is about making retrospective judgements about 
such subjective aspects of performance as personality and attitude" (Rix, 1990, 
p. 51 ). Performance appraisals encourage the setting of safe goals and perpetuate the 
organisation's acceptance of mediocre employee performance (Crow, 1996). 
Further, "evaluation of performance nourishes fear" (Deming, 1986, p. 108). This is 
patiicularly so for those on the ground level of an organisation. As Brough (1994) 
notes: 
"Most people working on the shopfloor have probably never come out of 
any formal test they have taken very well - they thus feel they have 
everything to fear and nothing to gain - this is at the heart of their disquiet 
about the whole system and why, in principle, they infinitely prefer a 
rnJJective system for security" (p. 21). 
27 Cited in Gomez-Mejia et al. (1985). 
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In addition, employees are less likely to voice questions for fear their supervisor will 
doubt their competence (Deming, 1986). 
Performance appraisals are fraught with behavioural difficulties. As many as 80% of 
employees believe their performance would rate above average or higher (Mandt, 
1984 ). This translates to a large proportion of the workforce who "to protect their 
self-esteem ... will automatically accuse the company, their bosses, and the system of 
bias" (Mandt, 1984, p. 18). Managers and supervisors have difficulty with the 
performance appraisal process. They are uncomfortable providing feedback on 
employee's progress (Zemke, 1985). This is evident in the many rating errors that 
affect performance appraisal. 
6.1.4. Rating errors 
"Managers often create a negative perception of the connection between pay 
and performance" (Lawler, 1981, p. 51). 
When managers are rating employees, objectivity and consistency do not exist and 
bias on the part of the evaluator is inevitable (Wilkerson, 1995). This results in 
rating errors when appraising an employee's performance. Rating errors occur when, 
for various reasons, managers rate employees based on factors other than 
performance. The central tendency rating error may be the most serious (Lawler, 
1981 ). This is where supervisors avoid rating employees in any of the extreme 
categories. Ratings are therefore clustered around the midrange (Lawler 1981; Tudor 
et al., 1996). It is easier for managers to rate in a safe range, particularly when 
extreme ratings require further explanation or measurement (Sink and Sahl, 1995). 
Closely related to central tendency is the problem of leniency. Leniency transpires 
when managers do not use the low ratings in order to avoid conflict (Applebaum and 
Shapiro, 1991; Zemke, 1985). 
The halo effect is another common rating error. This results when an employee's 
performance in one area affects the ratings of other areas (Zemke, 1985). Popular 
employees are rated more highly (Tudor et al., 1996). 
Further examples of rating error, are when supervisors are mistakenly influenced by: 
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i) recency: Supervisors focus on the most recent behaviour exhibited by the 
employee, rather than rating performance across the total appraisal period 
(Zemke, 1985). 
ii) constancy: Employees are rated in rank order, rather than being rated based 
on individual performance (Zemke, 1985). 
iii) the assertiveness of an employee: Assertive employees receive higher pay 
increases (Gupta and Jenkins, 1996). 
iv) stereotyping: Ratings are influenced by a person's age, sex, religion, culture 
or race (Tudor et al., 1996). 
v) length of service (Zemke, 1985). 
vi) supervisors who "guess when they aren't sure" (Zemke, 1985, p. 26). 
vii) favouritism and politics (Wisdom and Patzig, 1987). 
The above rating err9rs tend to be unconscious rather than deliberate. However, a 
supervisor may deliberately "fix" ratings by giving the maximum increase possible to 
employees, "thereby guaranteeing himself [sic] a quiet life" (Brough, 1994, p. 26). 
This is more likely to occur when performance appraisals are linked to pay (Tudor et 
al., 1996). 
It is clear therefore, that performance appraisals are faced with many difficulties, 
hence tb.e plethora of criticisms. "One has to suspect that at least some of the 
criticism leveled against appraisal systems has its basis in simple frustration" 
(Zemke, 1985, p. 32). A factor that contributes to the problems with performance 
appraisals is the effect they can have on teamwork. 
6.2. Teamwork 
"The surest way to destroy cooperation and, therefore, organizational 
excellence, is to force people to compete for rewards or recognition, or to 
rank them against each other (Kohn, 1993, p. 58). 
Pay for performance systems do not promote teamwork (Deming, 1986; Parnell, 
1991 ), but instead create a "lone ranger" mentality (Wilkerson, 199 5, p. 4 3). If 
employees are rewarded for individual performance, they will be unlikely to work as 
part of a team to improve the processes of their company (McConnell, 1991; 
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Deming, 1986). Further, the "openness, trust [and] joint problem solving" an 
organisation has will be diminished (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991, p. 32). 
Pay for performance may also have the effect of dividing a workforce into those who 
suppmi the system and those who do not (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991). Flannery 
et al. (1996) separate employees into three groups. The first third will embrace the 
system eagerly. The second third will be more cautious and will wait until the 
system proves itself, with the remainder of employees being critical of the system 
regardless of its effectiveness. One group that has been particularly critical of pay 
for performance are the unions. 
6.3.Union Attitudes 
A potential problem when introducing pay for performance systems is union attitudes 
(Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). A union can have a levelling effect "on a pay structure" 
(Balkin, 1989, p. 303) and this is inconsistent with the pay for performance 
philosophy. Unions have historically been opposed to pay for performance (Gross 
and Bacher, 1989). A major objection of the unions, is once a pay for performance 
system is introduced unions can be isolated or removed from pay negotiations 
(O'Connor, 1994). When a pay for performance system is introduced the unions are 
effectively "impotent, since for the purposes of wage increases, all wages [become] 
performance based" (Proctor et al., 1993, p. 154). 
Unions are· also critical of the often-subjective nature of performance criteria 
(Anonymous, 1996b; Balkin, 1989). The union involved in negotiations with the 
BBC believe pay for performance is "inherently unfair and cannot be administered to 
ensure that discriminatory practices do not creep in" (Anonymous, 1996b, p. S8 
[emphasis added]). Unions prefer objective measures of performance, and those that 
promote teamwork (Balkin, 1989). For this reason unions are not as vehemently 
opposed to group performance based pay plans as they are towards individual ones. 
7.SUMMARY 
Pay for performance is a concept that has evolved from circa 181h century B.C. and is 
supported by equity and expectancy theories. The term pay for performance now 
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refers to a plethora of systems, some of which do not truly pay an employee for their 
performance, but are viewed as entitlements. 
Before deciding to adopt a pay for performance system, an organisation must be 
aware of the associated advantages and disadvantages. An organisation may find 
once a pay for performance system is implemented they have a stronger focus on 
strategic objectives, organisational performance is improved and they are more 
responsive to their environment. Conversely, there are major criticisms about the 
performance management process, the effect on teamwork and the response from 
unions. Further concerns are regarding: 
"improper design and implementation; difficulties in paying for individual 
performance; lack of conviction on the part of workers that pay is really 
linked to performance; and inadequate or inappropriate objectives, criteria, 
and measures" (Lowery et al. (1996) p. 27). 
Many of these disadvantages may be reduced or avoided altogether by addressing 
design and implementation issues of a pay for performance system. 
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Chapter 3 
Design and Implementation 
of a Pay for Performance System 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Once an organisation has determined the advantages of introducing a pay for 
performance system outweigh the disadvantages, the attention will then turn to 
design and implementation. Communication, employee involvement and 
management suppo1i play a pivotal role in both phases. Design of a pay for 
performance plan is a complex task (Goodstein, 1988). An organisation must 
undertake a thorough review to determine the type of system that will best suit its 
unique circumstances (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991 ). This chapter examines the 
above decisions and identifies guidelines for developing goals, performance 
measures and performance appraisals. Finally implementation issues are discussed. 
2. COMMUNICATION, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND 
l\1ANAGE~11ENT SUPPORT 
No matter how a new pay system is promoted, the concept of cutting base pay and 
replacing it with performance based pay will alarm most employees. Creating this 
unstable atmosphere may be necessary in order to lead a poor performing 
organisation to a new level of accountability (McSparran, 1993). A "compensation 
system must not only be fair, reliable, and valid; it must also be perceived as fair 
reliable and valid" (Mc Ginty and Hanke, 1989, p. 15). It is the employees' 
perceptions of a pay for performance plan that determines its ultimate success 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 1985). Communication, management support and employee 
involvement each have a positive relationship with a plan's success (McAdams and 
Hawk, 1993). They are necessary before, during and after the design and 
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implementation of a successful pay for performance plan, regardless of how well it is 
designed (McAdams and Hawk, 1993; Sink and Sahl, 1995). 
2.1 Communication 
"Putting a plan out there without the communications piece would be like 
investing $10 million in a piece of equipment and never turning it on" 
(Livingston, 1998, p. 22). 
The purpose of a pay for performance plan is to communicate what is critical to an 
organisation's success (Berger and Moyer, 1991). However, when a system is 
introduced this often highlights the inadequacies of existing communications (Kinnie 
and Lowe, 1990). Communication's role is as pivotal as design to the efficacy of a 
pay for performance plan. Without effectively communicating details of a new pay 
system from the outset, employees are likely to resist the plan and that resistance will 
be difficult to overcome (Sahl, 1994a). 
Effective communication will increase employees understanding and acceptance of a . 
plan (Merchant and Riccaboni, 1990; Sahl, 1994a; Wisdom and Patzig, 1987). If a 
reward system is easy to understand, the motivational value of the system will 
increase (Tang et al., 1987). The more complicated a pay for performance plan, the 
more important it is to allocate resources to communication and training (Gandossy 
and Scheffel, 1995). Communication about a plan must be clear and regular (Berger 
and Moyer, 1991) and should: 
• "Tell people what you are going to do. 
• Tell them what you are doing. 
o Tell them what you have done" (Sahl, 1994a, p. 48). 
The more frequent the communication, the better the results (McAdams and Hawk, 
1993). Another way to improve communications is to involve employees in the pay 
for performance plan's design and implementation. 
2.2 Employee.Involvement 
Employee involvement is an: 
"extension of the power to make decisions and of business information, 
rewards for performance, and technical and social skills to the lowest levels of 
the organization" (Ledford, Jr., 1993, p. 143). 
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Involving employees in improving an organisation's performance is the "key to 
competitiveness" (McAdams, 1995, p. 54). Further: 
"[i]f the plan is well designed, well communicated, and thoroughly supported, 
the experience can be positive and rewarding not only for the company but for 
the individual as well" (p. 77). 
Commitment and support for a pay for performance plan is increased when 
employees are involved in its design (Gross and Bacher, 1993; Merchant and 
F'"iccaboni, 1990; F ... omanoff, 1989; Wisdom and Patzig, 1987; Yakovac, 1996). 
McAdams (1995) found when non-management employees were involved in the 
design of pay for performance systems, non-financial results, such as business 
performance, teamwork and the performance reward link, were improved. This 
provides support for the notion that involving employees in the design helps instil a 
sense of ownership of a new system (McAdams, 1995). 
Ownership increases, along with acceptance and understanding of the new pay 
system, when management and employees are involved in the design of their 
compensation system (Cumming, 19 8 8). The overall effectiveness will be further 
enhanced when a personnel representative acts as a consultant to this process 
(Cumming, 1988). As an example, if goals and measures are set autocratically, then 
the pay for performance system will not work (Rondeau, 1992). However, should a 
taskforce of employees influence the setting of goals and measures, satisfaction with 
the system will increase (McAdams and Hawk, 1993). 
The benefits of employee involvement are also evident when employees are involved 
in the implementation of a system. McAdams (1995) discovered when non-
management employees were involved in the implementation of a system, 
satisfaction, business performance, teamwork, and the performance reward link, were 
all improved. This may be a flow-on effect from being involved in the plan's design. 
Italian motor vehicle company, Fiat, experienced minimal resistance to the 
implementation of their system because managers were involved in the plan's design 
(Merchant and Riccaboni, 1990). In view of the above factors, it is imperative that 
there is a strong emphasis on communication and involvement when designing and 
implementing a pay for performance system. 
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2.3 Management Support/Leadership 
.'.'History teaches that without effective leadership at the top, the rest of the 
organisation will struggle to improve" (Longenecker and Gioia, 1994, p. 5). 
Strong leadership influences the success of a pay for performance plan (Longnecker 
and Gioia, 1994). A plan is more successful when a monomaniac drives the process 
(Gandossy and Scheffel, 1995), for without this forceful leadership an organisation 
will not achieve its objectives (Johnson, 1992). Such leadership is evident in top 
management, who introduce or champion the majority of pay fo'r performance plans 
(McAdams, 1995). 
Support from the Board of Directors (or equivalent) and top management for the 
process of change is crucial to the success of a new (or revised) plan (Berger and 
Moyer, 1991; Kim1ie and Lowe, 1990; Mon-is, 1996). This support is so critical, a 
plan should be revised until approval is forthcoming (Tang et al., 1987). The role of 
the Board of Directors and top management continues to be important through the 
implementation phase (Berger and Moyer, 1991). There is a positive relationship 
between public expressions of support by managers and the non-financial results of 
the plan (McAdams, 1995). Employees must be informed of the plan's progress and 
be aware that management continues to pledge their support and alliance to the 
system (Berger and Moyer, 1991). 
3. DESIGNING AP AY FOR PERFORMANCE SYSTEM 
"When asked for a solution to a compensation issue facing a major corporation, 
a leading compensation strategist responded "What other problem would you 
like me to create"" (Goodstein, 1988, p. 68). 
Pay for performance is not ~ panacea, however, organisations can benefit from its 
motivational value when the system is used appropriately (Stewart et al., 1993). 
A universal pay for performance plan can not meet the needs of all organisations or 
employees (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991). Each organisation has unique 
requirements driven by their individual circumstances. Thus, organisations are urged 
to tailor their pay for performance plan in order to maximise their effectiveness 
(Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991; Krajci, 1990; Postrel, 1993; Silburt, 1987). Further, 
any design should be customised to suit different positions within an organisation 
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(Cumming, 1988). 
A new compensation system must be integrated with other organisational changes 
and support change initiatives (Bunyan and McGill, 1997; Flannery et al., 1996). 
The introduction of a pay for performance system should be only part of a more 
comprehensive organisational change strategy (Giblin and Kelley, 1994 ). If a 
compensation system is introduced in isolation it will founder (Brough, 1994). 
A popular approach has been for organisations to take a strategic view when 
designing their pay for performance systems (Milkovich, 1988). This strategic 
approach is based on three premises: 
i) "compensation policies and practices differ widely across organizations 
and across employee groups within organizations" (Milkovich, 1988, 
p. 263); 
ii) "decisions managers and employees make help shape these differences" 
(p. 264); and 
iii) "fitting co,mpensation systems to environmental and organizational 
conditions makes a difference" (p. 264). 
Such a belief is based on contingency theory, where decisions are contingent upon 
various factors (Milkovich, 1988). The premise being, an organisation's strategy and 
its compensation strategy should "fit" each other (Milkovich, 1988, p. 282). The 
compatibility of these two strategies influences an organisation's performance 
(Milkovich, 1988). However, the task of matching these two strategies has been . 
likened to "shooting at a moving target" (Milkovich, 1988, p. 283). 
This concept of matching has been extended to encompass: 
"congruence between goals that organizations seek, strategies that are most 
likely to attain those goals, cultures that support these strategies and reward 
systems that elicit · and maintain behaviors that are consonant with the 
appropriate competitive strategy and its supp01iing culture" (Muczyk, 1988, p. 
225). 
A careful analysis of an organisation and its environment is an esse~tial first step 
when designing a pay for performance plan. Examination of a number of internal 
and external factors will guide a firm towards the most suitable pay for performance 
plan. This will help asce1iain potential organisational barriers to implementing an 
equitable and effective pay for performance system (Dulling, 1996). 
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3.1 Internal factors: 
.'.'Obviously even the best conceived pay plan won't make a company truly 
effective. Though effective pay plans can help focus and reinforce employee 
efforts, they cannot compensate for an absence of strategic planning, effective 
leadership, a positive corporate culture that builds employee commitment to 
the enterprise, sound financial management, an innovative marketing strategy, 
or solid investment strategy" (Giblin and Kelley, 1994, p. 43). 
An organisation that uses a pay for performance plan "without regard to the 
cstablishn1ent and maintenance of the proper organizational clii~rnte is analagous to 
planting crops in a paved parking lot" (Wisdom and Patzig, 1987, p. 27). 
When introducing (or revising) a compensation programme, the organisation's 
culture must be taken into consideration (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995; 
Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991; Stewart et al., 1993). 
Culture is defined as: 
"a broad mixture of management practice, organisational structure, reward 
systems, employee characteristics, technological resources, access to 
information, decision• making and standards of performance" (Bunyan and 
McGill, 1997, p. 12). 
The culture of an organisation is akin to the personality of an individual, and has 
been referred to as "how the organization feels to outsiders, its procedures and 
practices, how it reacts to event and deals with problems" (Brough, 1994, p. 29). 
In order to determine the 'personality' of an organisation, a survey of employees is 
commonly conducted (Gross and Bacher, 1989; Kanin-Lovers, 1987). Establishing 
the current culture of an organisation is a critical success factor when designing an 
effective pay for performance plan (Flannery et al., 1996). So too is the culture of 
the organisation's society. Those individuals in instrumental cultures (e.g. USA) will 
perform at high levels when they are satisfied with the connection between effort and 
performance, and performance and rewards. Employees in instrumental cultures are 
"preoccupied with immediate gratification" (Muczyk, 1988, p. 226). In nonnative 
cultures (e.g. Japan), high performance is more likely to be caused by values, such as 
loyalty and commitment to the organisation, as opposed to being motivated by an 
incentive (Muczyk, 1988). 
Culture is particularly important m public sector organisations, for pay for 
performance is often only one of a myriad of changes designed to change the 
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organisation to be more responsive to its environment (Brough, 1994). Often 
organisations will find a proposed compensation system is not appropriate for 
particular sections of their workforce (Claman, 1998), or the entire organisation 
(Lawler, 1981 ). The "cultural readiness" of an organisation for pay for performance 
can be a determining factor in the plan's success (Gross and Bacher, 1993, p. 53). 
Another factor that contributes to the success or failure of a pay for performance plan 
is the setting of quality corporate objectives (Geske, 1989). The best pay for 
performance plan will not compensate for poor objective setting (Geske, 1989). 
Similarly, should the strategies to achieve organisational objectives be misguided, 
this will have a negative effect on the organisation that no compensation system can 
neutralise (Perry, 1988). 
At different stages of its life cycle an organisation will have different strategies and 
objectives (Stewart, 1993). For instance, when an organisation is "in a survival or 
turnaround mode" the redesign of a compensation system may not be a high priority 
for management (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991, p.36). A pay for performance 
system should be appropriate to the organisation's current life cycle (Stewart, 1993). 
Further, the system should be compatible with other management control systems 
(Anonymous, 1988; Tang et al., 1987) and other components of the pay system 
(Young, 1990). All elements of the compensation package should work together to 
achieve the same objective (Young, 1990) . 
. 
An employee's base pay influences their perceptions of an incentive payment (Ash, 
1993; Meehan, 1992). Should the base salary be inadequate, any performance 
payment will be viewed as an entitlement (Ash, 1993 ). This belief will not reinforce 
the performance reward link (Meehan, 1992). If salaries are not competitive they 
should be increased rather than trying to use a pay for performance system as a 
counterbalance (Fowler, 1988). Pay for performance works well when base pay is 
competitive (Meehan, 1992). What is competitive depends, in part, on factors 
external to the organisation. 
3.2 External factors: 
The enviromnent an organisation is facing is shaped by elements such as: 
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i) Tax and legal issues (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995); 
ii) Industry and competitor pay practices (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995; 
Milkovich, 1988); 
iii) Unionisation (Haubrich, 1994; Milkovich, 1988); and 
iv) The organisation's industry and its competitive position within it 
(Haubrich, 1994). 
Together these factors influence compensation strategy (as illustrated in Figure 1, 
page 34), and thus the designs of the most appropriate pay for performance system 
for an organisation. 
While an effective pay for performance system should be tailored to each 
organisation, there are a number of general design and implementation principles. 
These are equally relevant to both public and private sector organisations, and 
include axioms to guide the setting of objectives, the design of goals, performance 
measures, and performance appraisals (Lowery et al., 1995). 
Figure 3-1 - Determinants of compensation strategy 
(Adapted from Milkovich, 1988, p. 274) 
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An organisation must be clear about what it plans to achieve by implementing a pay 
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for performance system. There are two benefits to establishing these objectives prior 
to system design: 
i.) "The design and implementation of the plan can be structured to make 
it more likely that the goals are accomplished ... 
ii.) by having clear objectives the organization can regularly measure how 
successful the plan is" (McAdams and Hawk, 1993, p. 53). 
Wallace28 found, out of six organisations that had no clear objectives for introducing 
Rigg (1992) believes the motivation behind pay for performance systems is to "link 
action and performance to reward and to motivate the team to satisfy the 
organizational goals" (p. 27). 
However, an organisation will rarely have a single objective when implementing pay 
for performance (Mandt, 1984). Objectives may also be to: 
i) Align the organisation's compensation with its cost structure (Giblin and . 
Kelley, 1994); 
ii) Recruit employees that fit the organisation's culture (Lederer and 
Weinberg, 1996; Mandt, 1984); 
iii) Reward outstanding individuals and team performance (Lederer and 
Weinberg, 1996); 
iv) Inspire superior performance (Lederer and Weinberg, 1996); or 
v) Provide an organisation with a competitive advantage (Ash, 1993). 
It is important that all objectives are acknowledged so the optimal pay for 
performance plan may be designed for the organisation (Mandt, 1984 ). 
3.4 Performance Management 
A performance management system is made up of goals, performance measures and 
perfou1iance appraisals (Brough, 1994)29 It is further affected by an organisation's 
communication systems, strategies and objectives (Stewart, 1993). It is essential that 
28 Cited in Perry (1988), not referenced. 
29 For a more comprehensive definition of performance management, see Chapter 2. 
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these elements work well together before incentives are introduced (McDermott and 
Hackett, 1997). For some organisations this may mean areas that are not operating 
effectively are identified and changes are made (McDermott and Hackett, 1997). 
Flannery et al. (1996) believe the performance management programme should run 
for 12 to 18 months without the pay programme. This enables the organisation to 
refine the system, ensure equitability and nurture the type of culture necessary for the 
new pay plan to work as intended (Flannery et al., 1996). Due to the sensitive nature 
of the pay system, changes should be made cautiously, over a time frame that is 
suitable to the individual circumstances of the organisation (McSparran, 1993). 
3.5 Goals 
The staiiing point for designing the goals for a pay for performance system is with an 
organisation's business plan. This plan should state the organisation's goals, 
objectives and strategies (Ross, 1988) and support the organisation's mission 
statement (Sink and Sahl, 1995). From this, individual or team goals can be 
determined that will be linked to the organisation's strategic objectives (Dyment, 
1987; Kinnie and Lowe, Meehan, 1992; Minken, 1987; Romanoff, 1989; 1990; Sink 
and Sahl, 1995). This will help ensure goal congruence (Tang et al., 1987). 
In practice, this will mean goals will include short and long term objectives (Haq, 
1995; Sink and Sahl, 1995; Tang et al., 1987), divisional and organisational goals 
(Kay and Lerner, 1995), and contain a balance of quality and productivity targets 
(Ricciardi, 1996). In order to have optimum motivational value, goals must also 
meet the following criteria. They must be: 
i) achievable. If goals are not achievable then employees will become 
discouraged and uru11otivated (Liccione, 1997; Ross, 1988); 
ii) controllable. (Minken, 1987; Ross, 1988; Yakovac, 1996); and 
iii) clear. An employee will not know how to achieve a goal that is unclear 
(Licdone, 1997; O'Connor, 1994). If a manager believes this is 
impossible "it should be pointed out that if that were true, they would be 
unable to distinguish between their best performers and worst performers" 
(Liccione, 1997, p. 20). 
It is important that there are not too many objectives or employees will be unsure of 
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the organisation's priorities (Macaulay and Cook, 1994). Between three and five 
factors critical to the success of the organisation should be utilised (Livingston, 
1998). Establishing appropriate goals is essential to the success of a pay for 
performance system, for they form the very foundations on which the plan is built 
(Lowery et al., 1995). However, equally impmiant is the selection of performance 
measures (Heneman, 1992). 
3.6 Performance Measures 
"Rewarding performance without measuring results is like paying the 
winner of a game, but not telling the players how the score is kept" 
(McSparran, 1993, p. 119). 
Choosing meaningful measures, to determine whether a goal has been achieved, is a 
formidable task. As with goals, performance measures should be controllable (Tang 
et al., 1987). Kaplan (1984) believes the selection of performance measures is an art. 
Public sector organisations are faced with unique challenges when determining . 
performance measures (Wisdom and Patzig, 1987, p. 130): 
i) Many public sector organisations operate in the service sector where 
choosing meaningful performance measures poses a particular challenge 
(Wisdom and Patzig, 1987); and 
ii) The absence of a profit motive as an impetus for outstanding 
performance, and therefore, as a benchmark for measurement (Wisdom 
and Patzig, 1987). 
There is a growing awareness that accounting measures such as return on investment 
and earnings per share may not reflect an organisation's success (Young, 1990). 
Further, using solely accounting measures will not reflect the diversity of an 
organisation's strategic goals (Haq, 1995). An organisation will need to tailor 
performance measures to suit each type of position in an organisation (Cumming, 
1988). In most cases, multiple measures of performance are essential to reflect an 
employee's performance (Tang et al., 1987). There is some disagreement as to the 
optimal number of measures of performance, however, there should not be too many 
(Smith et al., 1987). It has been suggested there should be as many measures as 
necessary (Anonymous, 1988), however, Zemke (1985) contends between four and 
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ten measures are optimal. All major job aspects should be measured (Gupta and 
Jenkins, 1996). 
Performance should be measured usmg results rather than usmg subjective 
personality traits (Romanoff, 1989). While personality traits, such as enthusiasm, 
leadership, ambition and discipline, may give some indication of success, they are 
not synonymous with success. People may possess the traits, and still not be 
successful. Basing performance measures on traits also assumes that they can be 
changed easily, whereas in reality it is a slow and difficult process (Romanoff, 1989). 
Performance measures may be based on productivity, however, it is important to 
include a quality component (Ricciardi, 1996). This can be difficult as many of the 
quality goals necessitate the use of subjective criteria. Further, a performance system 
which uses a lot of unverifiable subjective criteria will often come under close 
scrutiny and criticism from unions, and employees (Lowery et al., 1996). However, 
contrived measures will eventuate when objective measures are unduly stressed . 
(Meehan, 1992). Weighting objectives such as productivity and quality according to 
importance will make clear to employees exactly what is important to the 
organisation, and the importance of each objective (Geske, 1989, Sink and Sahl, 
1995). The key is to use a balance of measures (Tang et al., 1987). 
Objective criteria should be used where appropriate and where subjective criteria are 
used they should be clearly communicated so both the appraisor and the appraisee . 
have the same view of what performance is expected (Ross, 1988). It is essential that 
training be provided for all managers who are assessing subjective or behavioural 
criteria30 • This will aid understanding of the objectives (Sink and Sahl, 1995). To 
minimise the potential bias involved in using subjective criteria, multiple sources of 
performance data can be obtained (Rondeau, 1992). 360° evaluations, where 
employees are rated by people above and below them in the organisation (Kerr, 
1996), may be used for this purpose (Ricciardi, 1996; Wilkerson, 1995). Gandossy 
and Scheffel (1995) assert "[i]t is far better to roughly measure the right thing than to 
precisely measure the wrong thing" (p. 36). 
30 The issue of training is covered in section 4. 
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Performance measures are not static, but rather should be considered part of a 
dynamic process (Ricciardi, 1996). Performance measures should be reviewed and 
updated regularly, to keep in line with changing positions and objectives of the 
organisation (Meehan, 1992; Sink and Sahl, 1995). If the above suggestions are 
followed, clear and meaningful objectives will be produced, confidence will be 
instilled in the measurement process, and employees will be more satisfied (Wisdom 
and Patzig, 1987). Still, there must also be confidence in the performance appraisal 
process. 
3.7 Performance Appraisal 
A fair and effective performance appraisal is another prerequisite to reinforce the link 
between an employee's performance and their reward (Muczyk, 1988). The 
overriding purpose of performance appraisals is as a tool to encourage continuous 
improvement (Sahl, 1994b). The performance appraisal should be used to prompt 
discussions about cm;rent perfom1ance (Zemke, 1985), determine areas of weakness 
that can be improved through training, and evaluate the effectiveness of past training 
(Tudor et al., 1996). A performance appraisal should also serve as a justification for 
personnel decisions such as "promotions, demotions and terminations" (Tudor et al., 
1996, p. 41 ). Without such a system, an organisation may face legal difficulties 
should an employee challenge the validity of, for example, the choice of employee 
for promotion (Tudor et al., 1996; Zemke, 1985) . . 
Performance appraisals are particularly important at lower levels of an organisation 
(Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). They should be used as vehicles to improve 
communication and trust between the employee and manager (Kinnie and Lowe, 
1990). Multiple sources of data should be used to appraise an individual's 
performance (Gupta and Jenkins, 1996). As noted earlier in the Chapter, this may be 
achieved through use of 360° evaluations, for this encompasses the perceptions of an 
individual's supervisor, peers, customers and subordinates (Whitney, 1988). Using 
multiple sources of performance data will reduce the occurrence of rating error 
(Gupta and Jenkins, 1996). 
Following an appraisal interview between a supervisor and the employee there 
should be a mutual understanding as to the actions required to improve the 
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employee's performance (Sahl, 1994b). These sessions should be constructive with 
an emphasis on continuous improvement (Sahl, l 994b ). An employee should receive 
regular feedback on job performance and this should not be restricted to the appraisal 
interview (Guinn, 1987). Regular coaching by a manager "eliminates the often 
unpleasant and unproductive postmortem aspects of performance appraisal" (Guinn, 
1987, p. 41-42). In order to reinforce the behaviour encouraged by an organisation, 
there should be frequent performance appraisals (Silburt, 1987). The ideal frequency 
will differ for each organisation, as there is often a trade-off between the occurrence 
of performance appraisals and the cost of performance measurement (Johnson, 1992). 
Following the introduction of a performance appraisal process the results must be 
regularly monitored (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1985; McAdams and Hawk, 1993). 
Without this "quality-assurance feature" the system may regress (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
1985, p. 79). Many performance appraisals lack credibility, but this is due to 
insufficient efforts rather than a lack of knowledge (Muczyk, 1988). As detailed in 
Chapter 2, the main problem with performance appraisals is that of rating error. 
Adopting a forced distribution system is one way many of the rating errors may be 
overcome (Smith et al., 1987). 
A forced distribution system restricts "the percentage of employees who can be 
assigned a rating" (Meehan, 1992, p. 48). This 'forces' the allocation of ratings to 
follow a set distribution, thereby diminishing the rating e1Tors that can often distort 
performance appraisal systems (Smith et al., 1987). Prior to the introduction of a 
forced distribution system at Research Cottrell Inc., 61-82% of employees were rated 
in the top two performance categories and the lowest category was not used (Smith et 
al., 1987). Upon the addition of a forced distribution system to the Company's 
redesigned compensation plan, ratings were "more realistically and usefully 
distributed" (Smith et al., 1987, p. 20). Often this means the allocation of ratings 
follows a normal distribution similar to the general population, i.e. follows a bell 
shaped curve (Wilkerson, 1995). 
Major criticisms stem from the assumptions behind normal distribution. Normal 
distribution assumes the random selection of new employees, the position in which to 
place them, and in the choice of promotions (Wilkerson, 1995). Fowler (1988) 
Design and Implementation of a Pay for Performance System 41 
asserts in a successful pay for performance plan the number of employees in the top 
rating categories should increase over time. However, the static nature of forced 
distribution allows no movement to reflect the benefits of training, employee 
empowerment or reinforcement (Wilkerson, 1995). Fowler (1988) notes "if all a 
scheme does is to perpetuate a natural distribution of performance standards, it would 
not seem to be having any effect whatsoever" (p. 34). Additional criticisms of forced 
distribution systems are: 
i) The link between performance and reward is tainted (Meehan, 1992); 
ii) Ratings tend to be correlated with an employee's position and seniority 
(Meehan, 1992); 
iii) By ranking employees this creates a climate of competition rather than 
one of teamwork (Meehan, 1992); and 
iv) The validity of the performance appraisal is diminished. When explaining 
appraisal results, managers may explain that although the employee rated 
excellent,. the system will only allow a satisfactory rating. Not 
surprisingly this results in demoralised employees who have no faith in 
the pay for performance system (Sullivan, 1988). 
Anolh~r Hlt-aus of reduciug rnting errors is to hold mangers accountable for their 
ratings (Tudor et al., 1996). There is little incentive for managers to appraise 
employees in a careful, accurate and unbiased manner (Romanoff, 1989; Meehan, 
1992). }low well a manager encourages and assesses the performance of employees 
should form a large part of any manager's own performance appraisal (Romanoff, 
1989). In order to deal with potential disagreements with appraisals, there should be 
an official appeals system (Krajci, 1990). This will enable perceived inequities in 
appraisals to be corrected and adjusted for (Tudor et al., 1996). 
3.8 The Reward 
Extrinsic, or: financial, rewards are not the sole motivating factor behind outstanding 
employee performance (Rich and Florin-Thuma, 1990). Intrinsic rewards such as 
recognition and personal or professional development can also contribute to an 
individual's motivation and should not be ignored (Bice, 1990; Kerr, 1996; Rich and 
Florin-Thuma, 1990; Ross, 1988). Intrinsic rewards are particularly valuable when 
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an employee has regular contact with customers (Bice, 1990). 
Recognition is often undervalued as a motivator (Furlong, 1993). However, like 
other non-financial rewards, if they are used too frequently their effectiveness is 
diminished (Kerr, 1996). While intrinsic rewards, such as recognition, are important, 
they must be coupled with opportunities for promotion and equitable remuneration 
(Bice, 1990). Identifying rewards that will motivate employees is a difficult task 
(Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991) that must take into consideration individuals and 
their cultures (Kerr, 1996). Due in part to this, Fletcher Challenge now takes a "total 
compensation approach to compensating its employees in New Zealand" 
(Littlewood, 1995, p. 19)31 • Employees are able to choose how their remuneration is 
to be paid (Littlewood, 1995). This may be any combination of wages and benefits 
that suit the individual's unique circumstances (Littlewood, 1995). Such plans have 
been dubbed 'cafeteria' plans, where employees may choose benefits that they would 
like (Hodge, 1998). 
Providing money as the incentive for an employee's performance is "the most 
recognised means of reinforcement" (Parnell, 1991, p. 8). There are a number of 
options to consider when utilising this form of reward. Firstly, the size of the reward. 
To be effective, a reward must be substantial (Lederer and Weinberg, 1996; 
Rondeau, 1992; Whitney, 1988). It must be large enough to attract the attention of 
high achievers (Sink and Sahl, 1995). There is no consensus as to the definition of a 
substantial reward, however values range from 10 - 15% of base pay (Geske, 1989; 
Kerr, 1996; McSparran, 1993; Taylor, 1997). Rewards ofless than 5% will rarely be 
effective as motivators (Silburt, 1987). The use of an uncapped incentive is a 
compelling motivator for employees (Johnson, 1996). However, an organisation that 
uses uncapped incentives is not protected against inappropriate goals (Johnson, 
1996). 
When pay for performance plans are funded at low levels, the effect can emulate that 
of forced distribution (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991 ). However, the more 
communication and employee involvement within an organisation the less critical the 
31 For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances that led Fletcher Challenge to develop its total compensation approach, 
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size of the reward (McAdams, 1995). A pay for performance plan that has been 
effectively designed and implemented should be self-funding (Anonymous, 1988) . 
.. 
The timing of the reward is also important (Kerr 1996; Smith et al., 1987). If the 
rewards are infrequent, the connection between pay and performance will be weak 
(Kerr, 1996; Whitney, 1988). A reward must therefore be conferred soon after it is 
earned (Smith et al., 1987). Further, the reward must be differentiated from base pay 
(Whitney, 1988). The reward is thus very important to the success of a pay for 
performance plan. However, the implementation of a plan has been viewed as more 
important than the plan itself (McGinty and Hanke, 1989). 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF A PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
SYSTEM 
Success of a pay for performance system is strongly influenced by how it is 
implemented (Lowery et al., 1995). However, failure to recognise the impmiance of 
implementation issues often leads to the demise of a plan (Gross and Bacher, 1989). 
Organisations should allocate approximately twice as much effort to the 
implementation phase as compared to design (Gross and Bacher, 1989). 
Lowery et al. (1996) surveyed employees of a large company to assess their reaction 
to the implementation of a performance based pay plan. They found that overall the 
reaction to such a plan was very positive. However, there were some concerns with 
regard to the implementation aspect of the pay for performance plan. 
As noted earlier in the Chapter, effective implementation will involve a strong 
emphasis on communication, employee involvement and management support. 
While managers may pl~dge support to the plan, they also need to be equipped with 
the appropriate skills. Training is, therefore, of particular importance. 
4.1 Training 
Sufficient training for managers is a critical success factor to achieving an effective 
pay for performance system, for effective performance appraisals are largely reliant 
see Littlewood (1995). 
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on the skill of supervisors (Martin and Bartol, 1986). Without the appropriate skills, 
particularly in the area of performance appraisal, a plethora of rating errors will occur 
(Marlin and Bartol, 1986). Training of managers is as important to the accuracy of 
ratings, as the design of the ratings themselves (Zemke, 1985). When rating errors 
are reduced, so to is the potential future liability of the organisation (Tudor et al., 
1996). The ongoing training budget should be three times that of design (Gandossy 
and Scheffel, 1995). The skill required to conduct effective appraisals can only be 
gained through training and practice (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1985). Managers should 
be trained in four areas. How to: 
i) Set goals and establish appropriate measures; 
ii) Evaluate employees and avoid rating errors; 
iii) Resolve conflict; and 
iv) Coach and counsel staff (Meehan, 1992). 
Managers should provide comments to employees that are clear, constructive and 
positive (Romanoff, 1989). Managers should receive similar feedback about their 
rating performance, both from reviews of the system (Krajci, 1990) and their 
employees (Gross and Bacher, 1989). These reviews ensure the plan remains 
workable. 
4.2 Review of the System 
"Cha~1ge is the only constant" (Meehan, 1992, p. 49). 
The entire system should be reviewed regularly to ensure the plan is achieving the 
anticipated results (Gross and Bacher, 1989; Smith et al., 1987). A survey performed 
at regular intervals can be used as a gauge to measure aspects of the plan's 
performance (Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). A review can also identify weaknesses (Tang 
et al., 1987) and review the distribution of incentive payments to keep the system 
equitable and workable (Krajci, 1990). This monitoring is often viewed as a 
continuous process that must keep pace with major changes in an organisation's 
strategies, objectives and external environment (Tang et al., 1987). As Meehan 
(1992) asserts, "[i]t is essential that programs be constantly monitored to ensure that 
the conditions that enabled their success still exist" (p. 49). Organisations who do 
regularly review their pay for performance system found teamwork and business 
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performance was improved (McAdams and Hawk, 1993). 
5. SUMMARY 
An organisation that decides to design and implement a pay for performance system 
faces numerous challenges. Firstly, the organisation must be in a position to 
implement a system, with clear objectives, strategies and a supportive culture. The 
communication systems must be open, clear, and must encourage involvement from 
top management and should only be designed after a thorough review of the 
organisation. 
Following the design of the goals, performance measurement and performance 
appraisals, it is recommended that this performance management system be 
implemented without a link to remuneration until the system is refined and running 
smoothly. This is estimated to take between 12 and 18 months. The success of 
implementation is str9ngly dependant on communication, employee involvement and 
training of staff. 
Design and implementation decisions must be made while considering an 
organisation's unique internal and external environment. One system is not suitable 
for all organisations, or all sections within an organisation. 
The development of a pay for performance system in Business Unit A of the 
Christcnurch City Council is discussed in Chapter 5. The process Business Unit a 
followed was examined using the case study method, thus, Chapter 4 discusses the 





"The selection of a research topic and a corresponding method are in many 
ways ... a life choice. They are indicative of that which the researcher 
believes is important to 'see' iri the world, to investigate and know" (Rosen, 
1991, p. 21). 
This research has been conducted using the case study method. Hence, this chapter 
defines and identifies different types of case studies. The applicability of the case 
study method to this research will then be investigated, followed by a description of 
the method used to gain access. The specific data collection techniques and the data . 
analysis are then examined. 
2. CASE STUDY METHOD 
2.1. Definition 
Qualitative research: 
"'is an umbrella concept covering several forms of inquiry that help us 
understand and explain the meaning of social phenomena with as little 
disruption of the natural setting as possible. Other terms often used 
interchangeably are naturalistic inquby, interpretive research, field study, 
participant observation, inductive research, case study, and ethnography 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 5). 
This research employs the case study method. There is often a distinction made 
between the terms case study and field research. This is generally made on the basis 
of sample size. A case study is examining one unit or organisation, and field 
research two or more (Birnberg et al., 1990). However, as Ferreira and Merchant 
(1992) note: 
"sample sizes should not be used as a distinguishing feature of field 
research, because sample sizes, particularly as they might contribute to 
statistical significance, are not a primary concern of the field researcher" 
(p. 5). 
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In this research no distinction is made between the terms case study and field 
research. The expression case study will be used. 
There is no universally accepted definition of a case study (Cavaye, 1996). A case 
study is often defined with reference to its characteristics and associated strengths 
and weaknesses (Cavaye, 1996). This is illustrated in the following definition from 
Ferreira and Merchant (1992). In case studies: 
i) "The researcher has direct, in-depth contact with organizational 
participants, particularly in interviews and direct observations of 
activities, and these contacts provide a primary source of research data. 
ii) The study focuses on real tasks. or processes, not situations artificially 
created by the researcher. 
iii) The research design is not totally structured. It evolves along with the 
field observations. 
iv) The presentation of data includes relatively rich (detailed) descriptions 
of company contexts and practices. 
v) The resulting publications are written to the academic 
community ... Soine [case studies are also] easily read and used by 
practitioners" (p. 3). 
The importance of context to a case study researcher is illustrated by the following 
two definitions of case studies. Cavaye (1996) believes case research: 
"aims for in-depth understanding of the context of a phenomenon, but does 
not (though may) define a priori constructs and relationships" (p. 229). 
Yin (1994) ~elieves: 
"A case study is an empirical inquily that 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when 
• boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" 
(p. 13). 
Scapens, (1990) further distinguishes between different types of case studies, m 
paiiicular accounting case studies. Five broad categories are posed: 
i) Descriptive: The objective is to provide a description of current 
accounting practice; 
ii) Illustrative: "New and possibly innovative practices" of particular 
companies are detailed (p. 265); 
iii) Experimental: Potential benefits and difficulties in implementing new 
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practices can be determined; 
iv) Exploratory: This type of case study is used to explore the reasoning 
behind particular accounting practices. Theory generated from these case 
studies may be subject to empirical testing at a later stage; and 
v) Explanatory: Theory is used to explain particular behaviour/practice. 
A case study may fit into more than one classification, as the boundaries between 
each different category are blurred. This particular research fits into the descriptive 
and expioratory case study categories It attempts to des~ribe the practices of the 
Christchurch City Council (descriptive) and explores the decisions made by a 
Business Unit within the Christchurch City Council regarding how to design its 
remuneration system (exporatory). 
A researcher may undertake a single case study, or may decide to use multiple case 
sites. This research employs the former method. Single case studies enable: 
"the researcher to investigate a phenomenon in oepth, getting close to the 
phenomenon, ~nabling a rich description and revealing its deep structure" 
(Cavaye, 1996, p. 236). 
A single case study was the most appropriate for this research. There has been a 
dearth of research into the compensation practices of New Zealand public sector 
organisations. Adoption of the single case design enabled the researcher to provide 
an in-depth description of the design process of a Business Unit within a New 
Zealand local authority. Focussing on one case allows a researcher to deal with 
issues in more detail and with reference to their context within the organisation. 
Additional strengths of the case study method are examined in the following section. 
2.2. Strengths of the Case Study Method 
Over the past fifteen years management accounting researchers have been 
encouraged to unde1iake more case-based research (Drury and Tayles, 1995; Otley 
and Berry, 1994). The adoption of case research is seen as a necessary step "to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice" (Drury and Tayles, 1995, p. 268). There 
should be a nexus between academic and the practitioner worlds (McLean, 1988). 
This assertion is supported by Johnson (1992) who maintains "the most appropriate 
place to learn about business, and to research and develop theories about business is 
in places of business" (p. 189). 
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Management accounting research lends itself well to case research. As Bruns and 
Kaplan (1987) note: 
"management accounting phenomena exist only in complex organizations, 
with their rich interaction of people, products, processes, markets, 
technologies, and cultures, it becomes extremely difficult to study the 
subject except in actual organizational settings; management accounting 
systems must be studied in the settings where they have been developed and 
where they function" (p. 2-3). 
Further, Otley and Berry (1994) contend: 
"in order to assess and evaluate the operation of management accounting 
and control systems, it is necessary to place them in their wider context. 
There is thus a prima facie case for the use of case-based research methods 
in developing a fuller understanding of the relative role of accounting and 
other controls in the management of organizational performance" (p. 46). 
The design and implementation of a pay for performance system involves examining 
the organisation's internal and external environment. Case studies are particularly 
powerful for examining contextually contingent issues such as this (Benbasat et al., 
1987; Cavaye, 1996; Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Ryan et al., 1992). Case studies 
are valuable tools to aid exploration of complex events (Benbasat et al., 1987; Peck, 
1997; Yin, 1994). Adopting the case study method for this research has enabled the 
researcher to obtain detailed data about the pay for performance systems, that would 
not otherwise be publicly available (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). 
The type of research questions a researcher seeks to answer can give an indication of 
whether case research is the most appropriate method. Peck (1997) claims: 
"an exploratory 'What' question, combined with explanatory 'Why' and 
'How' questions ... suggest that a case study approach would be appropriate 
for the proposed research" (p. 17). 
The research questions that this research investigates fit into these categories. The 
questions are: 
i) What is a pay for performance system? 
ii) What are the advantages of a pay for performance system m a New 
Zealand context? 
iii) What are the disadvantages of a pay for performance system in a New 
Zealand context? 
iv) What are the issues when designing a pay for performance system? 
v) What are the issues when implementing a pay for performance system? 
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These arguments endorsing the case study method provide strong support for the 
adoption and suitability of the case study method for this research. However, the 
ehoice of research method is not solely dependent on the fit between the topic and 
the chosen method: 
"Ultimately, the reason for selecting one methodological approach over 
another is an issue of aesthetic choice, involved more with what a researcher 
desires to study than how she or he will do it. These choices involve a 
perception not only of what is 'beauty', but of the 'truth' underlying it" 
(Rosen, 1991, p. 21). 
Critics of the case study method do not share this view. Four major criticisms are 
presented in the following section. 
2.3. Criticisms of the Case Study Method 
As with other methods, the case study does have its limitations. Failure to attend to 
these criticisms will restrict those "who will read or accept the results" and therefore 
prejudice "the dissemination and communication of the research" (McKinnon, 1988, 
p. 35). Many criticisms can be reduced, or avoided altogether, through careful 
design. However, as Ferreira and Merchant (1992) note there is an inherent 
limitation when one chooses the case study method: 
"There is an obvious sample selection bias. Field researchers can study only 
organizations that are willing to be studied and these organizations may be 
unique in that they are proud of what they have accomplished, or they may 
have problems and are hoping for some input from an informed outsider" 
(p. 26). 
The quality of research design is often determined by examining a number of criteria. 
Common criticisms are addressed in the following sections. 
2.3.1. Internal Validity 
Internal validity is concerned with the data analysis phase of the research and relates 
to the problems associated with making valid inferences (Yin, 1994 ). Internal 
validity also "deals with the question of how research findings match reality" 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 201). To be valid, an argument proposed by a researcher must be 
"more plausible than other possible arguments" (Numagami, 1998, p. 3). 
Establishing tactics to improve internal validity of case studies is a difficult task 
(Yin, 1994). The data analysis description in this Chapter illustrates how 
conclusions were reached in Chapter 5 and thus strengthens this aspect of the 
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research. 
2.3.2. Construct Validity 
Construct validity is addressed during the data collection and composition phases of 
the research (Yin, 1994). Construct validity questions whether data collection 
methods are appropriate and support the constructs within the research (Cooper and 
Emory, 1995; Numagami, 1998). Collection of multiple sources of data will provide 
triangulation for findings and strengthen the construct valid~ty of the research. 
Furthermore, when findings are reviewed by an interviewee, construct validity is 
increased (Yin, 1994). These methods were adopted by the researcher, and are 
further discussed in the data collection section. 
Researchers who employ a qualitative research method must address the effects of 
human biases on data collection and interpretation (Merriam, 1998). Many criticisms 
of the case study method stem from potential researcher subjectivity (Bruns and 
Kaplan, 1987). There i~ a potential for bias on the part of the researcher and 
interviewee, and this decreases the construct validity of the research (Yin, 1994). 
Ryan et al. (1992) believe this is not something that can be avoided: 
"Social systems are not natural phenomena, they cannot be understood 
independently of human beings and the researcher cannot be regarded as a 
neutral independent observer. The social reality must be interpreted by the 
researcher and, thus, case studies represent interpretations of the social 
reality. There can be no such thing as an 'objective' case study (pp. 125-6). 
However, sl1ch biases can be controlled. How human bias was controlled in this 
research is addressed in Chapter 6. 
2.3.3. Reliability/Replicability 
The objective of reliability in: a case study method is to: 
"be sure that, if a later investigator followed exactly the same procedures as 
described by an earlier investigator and conducted at the same case study all 
over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions" (Yin, 1994, p. 36). 
The emphasis here is on reliable record keeping and planning. The use of a "case 
study protocol" is recommended as a method of dealing with the documentation 
problem (Yin, 1994, p. 37). A case study protocol is a "guide to the investigator in 
carrying out the case study" (Yin, 1994, p. 63). This research did not utilise a 
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protocol. However, at the inception of the research process a research proposal was 
written and presented to members of the researcher's department. This proposal was 
used a reference throughout the research. 
Replicability also deals with the issue of reliability. The difference is that when a 
study is replicated it is conducted in a different organisation. Otley (1996) contends 
replicability is not possible when conducting a case study: 
"The nature of the phenomena being studied and the context in which they 
are set inake it rather unlikely that cun1ulative and replicable results can be 
obtained; refinements in methodology will not significantly improve this 
situation because the problem is embedded in the nature of the situation 
being studied. Life is fundamentally not replicable''. 
Replicability was, therefore, not an objective of this research. 
2.3.4. External Validity 
External validity is concerned with establishing whether a researchers findings are 
generalisable (Yin, 1994). Generalisability with regard to statistical significance is 
not an objective of this research, nor is it for many others adopting the case study 
method (Yin, 1994). 
The case study method is not a monolithic method. "[It] can be applied and used in 
many different ways and ... is open to a lot of variation" (Cavaye, 1996, p. 227). The 
variation that this research has adopted is the interpretive approach. 
The interpretive approach to management accounting research is based on the belief: 
"that social practices ... are not natural phenomena; they are socially 
constructed .... This means that we should not be looking for universal laws 
and generalizations" (Ryan et al., 1992, p. 63). 
Taking this vh~w of a case study requires detailed accounts of organisational 
practices: 
"in their historical. .. economic, social and organizational contexts. For this 
purpose, researchers adopt a holistic orientation in which accounting is 
studied as part of a unified social system and a picture is built up of the 
system's wholeness, i.e. how the various elements contribute to the 
'individuality' of the system" (Ryan et al., 1992, p. 63). 
The findings that flow from this type of case study can provide management 
accounting practitioners with a deeper understanding of the context their work (Ryan 
et al., 1992). This context will assist practitioners when managing the demands of 
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their role (Ryan et al., 1992). An investigation of the environment and culture of the 
case study organisation was considered important to this research. Furthermore, 
contextual factors were paiiicularly salient when considering the design and 
implementation of a pay for performance system into Business Unit A of the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC). 
3. THE CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL 
3.1. Gaining Access 
Initial contact with the CCC was made through a relative of the researcher who was 
employed by the CCC. This person approached a member of the Human Resources 
team to assess the support this organisation was willing to provide and briefly 
described the nature of the proposed research. Upon receiving a positive response, a 
contact name and telephone number were obtained. Initial contact was made via the 
telephone, where the researcher and the proposed research were introduced. A 
personal interview was then undertaken. 
Following this interview, the interviewee sent an e-mail message to five members of 
Business Unit A's remuneration team, introducing the researcher and making them 
aware they would be contacted with a request for an interview. All requests for 
interviews were received positively and were conducted at the offices of the CCC. 
Interviews were also held with the Director of Human Resources and an Employee 
Relations Advisor. A total of eight people were interviewed. 
The words 'interview', 'research' and 'publication' were rarely used, for these words 
are often viewed as threatening by respondents (Buchanan et al., 1988). Each 
interview began with an overview of what the researcher was 'interested in' and how 
the information gathered was to be used. To encourage truthful and candid 
responses, interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of their comments 
(Buchanan et al., 1988). Questions were elicited both at the beginning and end of the 
interview to ensure the respondents were comfortable with the interviewing process. 
One year after the initial interviews were conducted the researcher revisited the site. 
Selected interviewees from the earlier research were contacted via email. This email 
served as an 'icebreaker' and re-acquainted the interviewees with the researcher and 
associated research. The email also stated the researcher would telephone to 
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determine their interest and availability for an interview. Responses to the initial 
email were positive and were received in the form of email and telephone calls from 
respondents. Interviews (both via telephone and in person) were then conducted. 
Three members of the Business Unit's remuneration team were interviewed and one 
Human Resource representative. A total of four people were interviewed in this 
phase of the research. 
3.2. Data Collection 
A feature of qualitative research, such as this, is the researcher is often the data 
collection instrument (Merriam, 1998). 
characteristic of this approach: 
There are a number of advantages 
"the researcher is responsive to context; he or she can adapt techniques to 
the circumstances; the total concept can be considered; what is known about 
the situation can be expanded through sensitivity to nonverbal aspects; the 
researcher can process data immediately, can clarify and summarize as the 
study evolves, and can explore anomalous responses" (Merriam, 1998, p. 7). 
However, as with other data collection tools: 
"the investigator as a human instrument is limite.d by being human - that is 
mistakes are made, opportunities are missed, personal biases12 interfere" 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 20). 
Data for this research was principally collected by interview. The interview has been 
noted as a "virtually infinitely flexible tool for research" (Breakwell, 1995, p. 230). 
The interview enables a researcher to "enter the other person's perspective" 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 72). An interview is often the only means of gathering the 
necessary data, paiiicularly when: 
"we cannot observe behavior, feelings, or how people interpret the world 
around them. It is also necessary to interview when we are interested in past 
events that are impossible to replicate (Merriam, 1998, p. 72). 
Prior to conducting the interviews, questions were piloted on members of the 
researchers department to ensure the sensibility and logical flow of the questions. 
While the ~esearcher had predetermined some questions, the interviews did not 
follow a set structure. This enabled the interviewer to follow additional lines of 
32 
Human biases are often present in interviews and are often viewed as an inherent limitation of case studies. They are 
covered in more depth in Chapter 6 - Limitations and Future Research. 
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questioning when appropriate (Breakwell, 1995). 
Open-ended questions were utilised within each interview as it was recognised this 
approach reduces the constraints on answers (Breakwell, 1995; Lowery et al., 1996). 
The interview length ranged from approximately 20 minutes to one hour, with the 
longer interviews being with the human resource employees. Following completion 
of both phases of interviews, telephone and email contact was made to clarify and 
expand points the researcher became aware of while writing Chapter 5. The validity 
of data collected via interview increases when you talk to a person more than once, 
their "openness and honestly" increases (Breakwell, 1995, p. 239). 
Interviews were not the sole method of data collection for this research. Multiple 
sources of evidence were utilised to increase the construct validity of the data 
(Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 1994). 
"The goal is to obtain a rich set of data surrounding the specific research 
issue, as well as capturing the contextual complexity" (Benbasat eta!., 1987, 
p. 274). 
The types of data collect~d from the CCC are noted in Table 4-1 (page 57). How 
these sources of data were combined to form Chapter 5, is discussed in the next 
section. 
4. DATAANALYSIS 
Following the collection of the data, ideas were grouped in a logical order and 
compared to the literature. This is commonly refened to as coding data (Dane, 
1990). Care was taken when interpreting the interview data and where possible 
multiple sources of data were obtained. 
In order to aid triangulation 'and accuracy of the findings, Chapter 5 was given to a 
member of the remuneration team to review. This is recommended as a tactic to 
"check whether [the results] make sense" (Breakwell, 1995, p. 242). The response 
from the interviewee was positive, with few corrections made to the final Chapter. 
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Table 4-1 - Data Sources from the CCC 
1. Business Unit A Brochure 
2. Critical Path to Performance: A Users Guide 
3. Excerpts from a training document 
4. Human Resources Strategy Document 
5. Minutes of Business Unit A's Remuneration meetings 
6. Notes from Business Unit A's Remuneration meetings 
7. Outside Staff Collective Employment Contract 
8. Personal Interviews 
9. Personal Value Plan 
10. Relevant memorandum between key parties of the remuneration team 
11. Salaried Staff Collective Employment Contract 
12. Team V~lue Statement 
13. Training Module Documentation 
5. SUMMARY 
The case study method was the most relevant and applicable research method for this 
research. It enabled the researcher to describe and explore the decisions and 
practices of the CCC, and refer to the context and environment that the organisation . 
faced. The criticisms of the case study method focus on validity (internal, external 
and contextual) and replicability. These criticisms are not considered relevant by all 
case study researchers, however, where possible tactics were employed to reduce 
prejudicial effects on the data and subsequent conclusions. Multiple sources of 
evidence were gathered in order to provide triangulation for the findings. One 
participant in the research reviewed and verified the findings in Chapter 5 and 




The Christchurch City Council 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This research investigated the process one Business Unit, within the CCC, followed 
when managing their remuneration system, particularly with regard to pay for 
performance. To provide a context for the pay for performance system this chapter 
begins with the background of the CCC and the remuneration system at the inception 
of Business Unit A's design process. This is followed by a description of the process 
Business Unit A undertook when designing its system and the advantages and 
disadvantages of their approach. Finally the findings are compared and contrasted 
with the literature which was presented in Chapter 2 and 3. 
2. THE CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL 
Prior to 1989 there were over 700 local authorities throughout New Zealand. With 
the passing of the Local Government Amendment Act in 1989, the number was 
reduced to 85 (Pallot, 1997). In Christchurch, there had been five territorial 
authorities, and three ad-hoc local authorities. These were amalgamated on 1 
November 1989, and became the CCC (Christchurch City Council, 1996a). 
Subsequent to the amalgamation, the CCC embarked on a period of change 
management. Between 1989 and 1993 change in the CCC focused on: 
• restructuring the organisation and amalgamating employment contracts 
• separating trading functions such as airport, electricity supply, public 
transport etc. 
• reducing the staffing establishment by a third 
• amalgamating existing budgets, changing the financial year and 
developing new budgeting processes 
• developing public consultation processes 
• zero rate increases for three years 
• amalgamating and developing a new City Plan 
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• implementing other new legislation covering such diverse areas as 
resource management, building, employment contracts, health and 
safety, human rights etc. 
• strategic planning, financial modeling and output budgeting etc 
(Christchurch City Council, 1996a, p. 3). 
As a result of these initiatives, the CCC was awarded a prize for excellence in local 
government, by the Bertelsman Foundation of Germany in 199333 (Christchurch City 
Council, 1996a). 
The appointment of a new City Manager in 1993, marked a further turning point for 
the CCC. The new City Manager took the opportunity to rethink where the 
organisation was heading. In doing so he asked the question: 
"[H]ow do we continue to improve our productivity, to improve the quality 
and range of services to our customers without spending more money?" 
(Christchurch City Council, 1996a, p. 3). 
The answer was to: 
"[W]ork smarter, not harder, and we will achieve that if we change the 
organisational culture to release the talents and creativity of all our people" 
(Christchurch City Council, 1996a, p. 3). 
At the time, the CCC utilised the "old police and control model, where Business 
Unit managers were saved from crises of their own making" 34• The Human 
Resources Department was cast in the role of "knights in white horses". 
Organisational restructuring was therefore necessary as the "existing structure no 
longer aligned with [the CCC's] new culture" (Christchurch City Council, 1996a, 
p. 4). As a result of this restructuring, the role of the Director of Human Resources 
was created35 • This position was to fulfil a "corporate-wide support and leadership 
role" (Christchurch City Council, 1996a, p. 4). 
Following the restructuring, Business Units gained the autonomy to manage their 
own human resources and investigate different forms of remuneration. Accordingly, 
Business Units possessed the flexibility to: 
33 This prize was awarded jointly to both the CCC and Phoenix Arizona, USA. 
34 All statements quoted in italics are comments made by interviewees. 
35 Four Director positions were created - Finance, Human Resources, Operations and Policy. The Corporate Office was also 
established (Christchurch City Council, I 996a, p. 4 ). 
The Christchurch City Council 
"adapt existing and emerging models to their own needs, as long as these 
align with Giving Value - Being Valued and meet the corporate objectives 
of performance planning and management" (Christchurch City Council, 
l 997j, p. 5). 
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Each of the 34 Business Units within the CCC, could take the opportunity to review 
their current remuneration system and decide whether any changes were necessary. 
If change was warranted, the Unit had the authority to determine the type of system 
that would suit their individual characteristics. In theory, this meant each Business 
Unit could design and implement a different remuneration.system. This autonomy 
extended to changing the base salary structure and implementing a pay for 
performance system. All changes to the Business Unit's remuneration system were 
subject to the approval from the relevant unions and employees. 
One interviewee justified this delegation of authority to Business Units by stating: 
"Does it make sense to have a collective contract for 1200 employees 
working in ve1y different areas? No. Therefore the Business Unit managers 
have the responsibility for their own human resources". 
Customising a pay for performance plan to suit an organisation's individual 
circumstances will maximise its effectiveness (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991; 
Krajci, 1990; Postrel, 1993; Silburt, 1987). Moreover, empowering Business Units 
in the area of remuneration provides: 
"a greater opportunity to link pay with performance ... an improved 
motivational effect to the pay program and . . . greater responsiveness to 
~apidly changing organizational structures (Smith, 1992, p. 22). 
It is important that all components of a pay system work together to achieve the same 
objective (Young, 1990). The two principle employment contracts within the CCC's 
remuneration system are reviewed to provide context to Business Unit A's decisions 
within their design process. 
2.1.Remuneration System of the Christchurch City Council 
An employee's base pay influences their perceptions of an incentive payment 
(Meehan, 1992; Ash, 1993). Should the base salary be inadequate, any performance 
payment will be viewed as an entitlement (Ash, 1993). This belief will not reinforce 
the performance reward link (Meehan, 1992). 
At the inception of Business Unit A's process to design a pay for performance 
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system, the CCC utilised an organisation-wide remuneration system. However, "this 
system did not suit the individual needs of the Business Units, and was not sending 
the right messages to employees". Thus, Business Units were able to investigate and 
implement a pay for performance system to suit their circumstances. When this 
research commenced, one Unit had implemented a Profit Sharing scheme and many 
Business Unit's were yet to address remuneration within their Unit. 
The organisation-wide remuneration system was characterised by its strong emphasis 
on collective employment contracts. Approximately 88% of employees were 
covered by four collective contracts and 12% by individual contracts. However, the 
traditional public sector contracts within the CCC, prior to restructuring, had slowly 
changed to reflect new developments such as broad banding36, 360 degree 
evaluations37 and, in one Business Unit, a form of pay for performance. 
The two principle collective contracts within the CCC represented 84% of 
employees38 • These contracts provided the basis for determining base salary levels 
for employees within each Business Unit. A summary of these two contracts 
follows: 
i) Salaried Staff Collective Employment Contract 1997/199939, 
"The salaried staff contract uses a Watson Wyatt scheme that bases 
remuneration on levels from 90-110%. 100% is working at full efficiency. 
The movements from 90-100% are problematic in that there are automatic 
increments eve1y six months". 
The • increments from 90-100% were to continue until six monthly 
performance reviews were developed and agreed upon between the CCC and 
the union. Increases from 100-110%, known as merit steps, were made in 
increments of 2.5% and were subject to performance. 
36 As noted in Chapter 2, broad salary bands allow a manager to stay in one broad salary band for the duration of their career, 
rather than being dependent on a promotion for a change in salary (Labich, 1992). 
37 360 degree evaluations allow employees to be rated by people above and below them in the organisation (Kerr, 1996), 
38 The remaining staff are represented by the Trades collective contract (3%), and the Shift Engineers contract (1 %). 
39 This contract was developed in conjunction with the Southern Local Government Officers Union. 
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ii) Outside Staff Collective Contract 1997 /199940• 
Outside staff are waged employees who are members of the unions 
responsible for negotiating this contract41 • The outside staff employment 
contract had two pay scales: 
"Pay scale one was almost prescriptive, in that there were pay rates for a 
range of functions, and your pay scale would only go up if you changed 
your position. Pay scale two was aimed at encouraging staff to develop 
skills and expertise. Pay scale two provides the opportunity to move 
throuf{h the pay scale" 
Following the introduction of pay scale two, employees covered by pay scale 
one could choose to remain on this scale or transfer to the new pay scale. All 
staff employed under the Outside Staff contract, after the introduction of the 
second pay scale, were automatically covered under pay scale two. 
Both the Salaried and Outside Employment Contracts included "a negotiated 
Consumer Price Index movement, that you get because of being a member of a 
. " umon . 
When referring to the CCC's organisation-wide remuneration system interviewees 
believed: 
"There was a realisation that the present remuneration system rewards 
employees for the length of service"; 
"While there is a merit step42, if you hang around for long enough then you 
would get the merit step because the manager who assesses your 
pe1formance would be too embarrassed not to award it"; 
"Once a year the manager looks at your pe1for111ance and whether you are 
due for a merit step. It is based on certain criteria, but they are pretty 
hairy". 
It was recognised there needed to be "significant development regarding salmy 
40 
This contract was developed in conjunction with the Amalgamated Workers Union of New Zealand, Transport and General 
Workers Union Incorporated, Service Workers Union of Aotearoa (Southern Region) and Canterbury Hotel and Hospital 
Workers Union Incorporated. 
41 
It is not compulsory for an employee to be a member ofa union. Employees who elected to be included in the Outside Staff 
contract and were not a member of one of the contributing unions were listed in the appendices to the contract. 
42 
Each position within the CCC is assigned a grade, or grades. For example, Grade 12 of the salaried staff collective 
employment contract means you will receive between $33619 and $42378 per annum. There are between 10 and 11 steps 
within each grade. Each step within the grade means you are paid a different amount. 
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movement compared wUh performance". Furthermore, a change was required in: 
"the mindset of employees, so there is no expectation of an automatic 
increase if I 00% is reached. There needs to be change. Employees need to 
be rewarded for pe1formance ". 
Movement of pay for performance into the public sector could not have occurred 
without a change in mindset43 of these organisations (Fowler, 1988). In this instance, 
employees expected an increase in their compensation regardless of their 
performance. Automatic increments, such as those within. the . Salaried Staff 
Collective Contract, were a "hang over from the State Public Sector mentality". 
This situation is not unique within New Zealand. The CCC was ''facing the same 
environment as any other local authority". 
A compensation system that pays for attendance rather than performance is 
incompatible with a pay for performance environment (Muczyk, 1988). In a move 
recommended by Smith (1992), each Business Unit within the CCC was given the 
authority to develop their own remuneration system, thus providing a greater 
opportunity to link pay to performance. The new performance oriented culture of the 
CCC is described in the following section. 
2.2.Pay for Performance and the Focus on Culture 
Following the appointment of the new City Manager there was a stronger emphasis 
on pay for p~rformance. "The City Manager was leading/ram the top". However: 
"rather than looking at pay for pe1formance on its own, the CCC was 
looking at cultural change ... there was a need to think about systems and the 
culture we wanted to create. Remuneration was part of that". 
To facilitate the cultural change advanced by the new City Manager a number of 
initiatives were undertaken. These included: 
i) the establishment of a Performance Development System in late 
1993/early 1994. This system was the CCC's version of a performance 
management system, and: 
43 'Change in mindset' refers to the change in thinking required within theorganisation. Employees must stop expecting 
automatic increases throughout their career (Fowler, 1988). 
The Christchurch City Council 
"[was] an on-going process of defining performance expectations, 
getting/giving feedback on performance, helping the ongoing 
development of team members, and documenting expectations and actual 
performance. [It was] an on-going cycle of communication rather than a 
once a year event" (Christchurch City Council, 1997a, p. 2). 
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The Performance Development System was gradually being superseded by 
value statements. These statements (as detailed below) were not a "new 
system", but rather an "evolution" of the Performance Development 
System (CCC, 1997j, p. 4). 
ii) the development of the CCC's cultural statement "Giving VALUE - Being 
VALUED" (Christchurch City Council, 1996a, p. 3) 
iii) the development of Team or Section Value Statements. This statement 
details the purpose of the Team, its overall objective and ties this to the 
Unit outcomes (Christchurch City Council, 1998). The Team's customers 
are identified, along with the result that represents value to the customer, 
how the result will be achieved and how it will be measured (Christchurch . 
City Council, 1996b ). 
iv) the introduction of Job Value Statements. These were gradually replacing 
job descriptions, and flow from Team or Section Value Statements. They 
are generic statements and therefore do not differ between people in the 
same position (Christchurch City Council, 1998). 
v) the development of Personal Value Plans (PVP). A Personal Value Plan is 
"a schedule of personal output objectives" split into three groups: core 
outputs, project/team outputs, and improvement outputs. Standards and 
deadlines for performance are specified to ensure the Team and Unit are 
able to achieve their objectives in a timely fashion. Personal Value Plans 
were being gradually implemented throughout the organisation. Each 
Business Unit could introduce the concept of Personal Value Plan "when 
they were ready44 ". 
vi) the execution of a climate survey. A survey was conducted to determine 
the morale of the staff and their attitude towards working for the CCC. 
44 The philosophy of letting the Business Units move at their own pace is in line with theCCC's decision to delineate human 
resource decisions to the individual Business Unit. This is discussed later in this Chapter. 
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The use of this type of survey is recommended as a means to determine 
the organisation's 'personality' or culture (Gross and Bacher, 1989; 
Kanin-Lovers, 1987). Establishing the current culture of an organisation 
helps to determine the most appropriate design for a pay for performance 
plan (Flannery, et al., 1996). On reflection, an organisation may find a 
proposed compensation system is not appropriate for particular sections 
of their workforce (Claman, 1998), or the entire organisation (Lawler, 
1981). 
As recommended by Anthony and Govindarajan (1995), the CCC made a concerted 
effort to align the objectives of the CCC and its employees. This was achieved 
through the use of the Unit, Section, and Personal Value Plans. Objectives in each of 
these plans were designed to support the CCC's overall mission statement. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5-1 (page 66). 
Figure 5-1 - Alignment of Objectives within the CCC 
(Christchurch City Council, 1996/97, p. 5) 
Same for everyone in Unit 




This strong emphasis on culture and value is recommended for Public Sector 
organisations, as they are often coordinating multiple changes to their environment 
(Brough, 1994). It is vital that pay for performance is integrated with other change 
initiatives (Bunyan and McGill, 1997; Flannery, et al., 1996). If pay for performance 
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is introduced in isolation it will fail (Brough, 1994). 
The changes made to the CCC' s strategies, culture and structure were essential if 
they wished to positively influence their performance (Muczky, 1988). These 
initiatives redefined the culture of the CCC and provided an environment more 
conducive to pay for performance. Business Unit A used the Value Statements as 
building blocks to their pay for performance system. The process Business Unit A 
followed when designing their system is described in the next section. 
3. BUSINESS UNIT A 
Business Unit A was one of 34 Business Units within the CCC. It employed 
approximately 130 people. Each Unit was further split into Teams or Sections. In 
April 1997, Business Unit A began to review the current remuneration system, to 
determine whether another system, or modifications to the current system, would be 
more compatible its individual circumstances. A remuneration team was formed to 
undertake this review and develop a system that would suit their Unit. 
Initially there was a call for volunteers for the remuneration team, however, this 
yielded only three responses45 • As there were so few volunteers, it was decided the 
managers of each of the five sections within the Business Unit should be part of the 
team. It is unclear why management were not included in the design of the pay for 
performance system from the outset, particularly when management support for a 
compensation system is pivotal (Berger and Moyer, 1991; Kinnie and Lowe, 1990; 
Morris, 1996). 
The remuneration team was made up of the Business Unit Manager, five Section 
Managers within the Unit, a representative from the human resources department, 
and two other volunteers from Business Unit A. The role of the Personnel Officer in 
any Business Unit's remuneration meetings was dependent on Unit requirements. 
The Personnel Officer could be an active member of the team, or a facilitator. In this 
instance, the representative from Human Resources was a facilitator, or guide, for the 
process. This technique is advocated by Cumming (1988) who believes ownership 
45 The actual number could be more or less than three. The interviewee was not certain of the exact number. 
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and understanding of the system is increased when human resource employees are 
used in this way. Furthermore, commitment and support for a pay for performance 
.. 
plan is increased when employees are involved in the design (Gross and Bacher, 
1993; Merchant and Riccaboni, 1990; Romanoff, 1989; Wisdom and Patzig, 1987; 
Yakovac, 1996). Employees are also more likely to understand and accept the new 
system when they have been involved in its design (Cumming, 1988). 
In addition to the members of the remuneration team, representatives from another 
Business Unit were able to observe the remuneration meetings, to increase their 
knowledge and awareness of options that may be appropriate for use in their own 
Business Unit's remuneration plans. 
Remuneration meetings began in April 1997 and continued until November 1997. 
The process followed in the subsequent seven meetings, was to help determine the 
optimal remuneration system for the Business Unit. 
3.1. The Design Process 
At the inception of the design process Business Unit A went into the remuneration 
meeting with a three-legged diagram (Figure 5-2, page 69). This diagram illustrated 
the three elements of the Personal Value Plan, and was a tentative blueprint for the 
remuneration system that would complement the Unit's circumstances. It was 
"really the pe1formance model for the organisation". 
The first meeting of the remuneration team excluded the Human Resource facilitator, 
as this meeting was to discuss the direction the Unit was considering for 
remuneration. The Human Resource Representative was invited to the second 
remuneration meeting to provide guidance on the process the team should follow. At 
this meeting some members of the team were surprised to learn from the Human 
Resource facilitator that it was not wise to ''jump into" the design of a system for 
their Unit without considering wider issues that affect the design of a pay for 
performance system. For some members "the initial thinking was, what are we 
doing? Let's get down to the real stuff of designing the system". 
To illustrate why it was important to take a broader perspective, members of the team 
were asked a number of questions. Firstly, "What is pay for performance?". As 
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with the definition of pay for performance provided in Chapter 2, responses were 
loosely grouped into two categories: the form of reward and the broad objectives of 
introducing the system. Members identified that pay for performance may: 
i) "change attitudes of employees 
ii) address poor performance 
iii) provide recognition 
iv) provide monetary reward" (Christchurch City Council, 1997k). 
Figure 5-2 - Personal Value Plan 








(individual or team) 
Secondly, when asked to stipulate specific objectives for implementing a pay for 
performance system in Business Unit A, it became apparent members were not clear 
on this issue. It was therefore agreed that the team should take a step back to: 
"understand what, we want to achieve,· what the principles and purposes of 
pay for performance are in the Unit, and what the issues are in terms of 
integration, both with other groups of staff and other forms of reward". 
As one interviewee described: 
"We went back to first principles, i.e. looking at the reasons why people 
want to implement pay for pe1formance. Initially the focus was all on the 
money, the financial side, trying to link pay and pe1formcmce. Now the 
focus has widened to look at lots of factors that affect pe1for111ance ''. 
As it was noted in the minutes to this meeting, "the more things you try to achieve 
with pay for performance the more chance for it to fail" (Christchurch City Council, 
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1997c, p. 1). This move to establish objectives prior to design and implementation is 
essential when cultivating the ideal environment for a successful pay for performance 
.. 
plan (McAdams and Hawk, 1993; Wallace46). Prior research has found that 
neglecting to specify objectives may contribute to a plan's failure (Wallace47). 
Finally, meeting two was used to identify the members' "worst fears about 
pe1formance bonuses" (Christchurch City Council, l 997k, p. 1 )48 • An awareness of 
the negative aspects of introducing a pay for performance plan is essential to ensure 
well reasoned and informed decisions (Young, 1990). The s'teep learning curve 
provided by the meeting with the Human Resources facilitator, meant members 
quickly became aware of a number of issues related to developing a pay for 
performance system. These were: 
i) "the principles of the system 
ii) how the system integrates with other rewards 
iii) the practicalities of how to develop a system" (Christchurch City 
Council, 1997k). 
The remuneration team now felt there was a need for a "total reward strategy". This 
decision was not unexpected, for all elements of a compensation system should work 
together (Young, 1990). Further, having a reward strategy and linking it to 
organisational strategy will positively influence performance (Milkovich, 1988). 
The three-legged diagram originally put forward as a potential model did not 
necessarily have to form part of the remuneration strategy. The team was encouraged 
to put aside any preconceived notions they may have of the ideal basis for pay for 
performance. Members were told: 
"the danger is if you focus on [the three-legged diagram], you may limit 
your thinking of how to develop bonus payments, or you may overlook 
things that should be considered to give you an integrated strategy". 
Following the meeting, the Human Resource facilitator provided the Unit Manager 
with an outline of the direction for the next series of meetings. This outline was 
agreed upon at the next meeting and a process diagram for this was developed 
46 Cited in Perry (1988), not referenced. 
47 Ibid. 
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(Figure 5-3, page 71) . 
. Figure 5-3 - Business Unit A Remuneration Team Process Diagram 
(adapted from Christchurch City Council, 1997b and 1997d) 
Identify the purpose of pay for performance in the Business Unit. 
Agreed assumptions 
i) We want to improve/increase staff performance 
ii) To recognise and reward that performance 
iii) To use the correct system to achieve this 
+ 
We need to know 
i) What are our Section or Unit objectives? 
ii) What is hindering us from meeting/exceeding them? 
iii) What can we do to remove these blocks and encourage/recognise/reward 
performance? 
+ 
Review the options 
Is pay for performance the appropriate option to achieve goals? 
Determine which options are the most appropriate for each situation 
Develop and implement the options 
(this may be done using 2 working parties) 
·lE rl1e disadvantages will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
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The remuneration team was now much more aware of what was involved m 
implementing a pay for performance system. It was agreed the Unit needed to: 
"work through fears ... cynicism and [the] integration of [a] variety of 
systems before developing "the system" " (Christchurch City Council, 
1997c, p. 2). 
The third meeting was principally held to determine the objectives for developing a 
pay for performance system for Business Unit A. It was resolved that the Unit's 
objectives were to: 
i) achieve agreement on explicit output results; 
ii) develop potential of employees; 
iii) lift performance by recognising, recording and rewarding "the extra 
effort, initiative, innovation and creativity"; 
iv) achieve performance "improvements for the Unit"; and 
v) improve job satisfaction and motivation (Christchurch City Council, 
1997d, p. 1). . 
However, the Unit did not refer to the purpose of aligning their compensation to the 
organisation's cost structure (Giblin and Kelley, 1994) and recruiting employees to 
fit the organisation's culture (Lederer and Weinberg, 1996; Mandt, 1984). This 
result was unexpected as the financial aspects of pay for performance are often the 
most compelling (Giblin and Kelley, 1994). 
The objective to achieve agreement on output results was unusual. Based on the 
proposed system at the inception of the design process, outputs were to form the 
basis of an individual's goals. Pay for performance would not solve the problems 
with goal setting, rather it is reliant on clarity in this area (Liccione, 1997). Perhaps 
the intention for this objective was to prompt more work in the performance 
management area before pay for performance was introduced. 
The third meeting also briefly covered different forms of pay for performance. This 
was to give members some background to other systems available, and introduce a 
different perspective to that which had already been presented (Figure 5-2, page 69). 
Having identified the Unit objectives, meeting four was used to identify blocks to 
meeting or exceeding Unit objectives. Members were encouraged to identify 
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methods of removing these blocks. Once the blocks were identified, the ideas were 
grouped into two logical categories: internal factors and external factors. Specific 
problems were identified within each of the barrier headings that would, if solved, 
lead to the CCC being able to meet its objectives more easily. The internal factor 
category was further broken down into the following sub-categories: 
i) "Resources 
ii) Attitude 
iii) Policy and procedures 
iv) Skill levels 
v) Miscellaneous" (Christchurch City Council, 1997e, p. 1). 
Examination of factors internal and external to the organisation provides an 
opportunity to determine potential barriers to implementing an equitable and 
effective pay for performance system (Dulling, 1996). Taking into consideration 
these factors will enable an organisation to determine the readiness of their 
organisation for a pay for performance system (Gross and Bacher, 1993). 
Furthermore, it may become evident that pay for performance is not appropriate for 
sections of the workforce (Clayman, 1998) or the entire organisation (Lawler, 1981). 
Meeting five focussed on sorting these blocks to achieving organisational objectives 
into the Prioritisation Matrix (Figure 5-4, page 74). This matrix: 
"enables you to decide on what order to tackle the items as well as whether 
an item should be dealt with at all". 
As a result of this prioritisation, four issues, or opportunities, regarding the current 
system were identified at the sixth meeting. Once these issues were identified, 
members of the team were assigned tasks in order to find ways to reduce the gap 
between the current system, and the system the team believed was the most 
appropriate. These tasks fell into the "must do" category of activities, and involved 
working on: 
i) Better recruitment; 
ii) Training to address non-performance; 
iii) Coaching for high performance; and 
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Figure 5-4 - The Prioritisation Matrix 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997a, p. 4-17) 
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Addressing these issues before implementing a system was essential in order to 
design the ultimate system. Meeting seven was used to determine the gap between 
where the Unit was and where they wanted to be, along with possible solutions. Four 
key issues for the staff and CCC were identified: 
i) An employee's remuneration does not vary with performance; 
ii) There is a lack of clarity on what the merit steps are based on; 
iii) The system depends on the effort made by managers and supervisors; and 
iv) Managers and supervisors do not understand how to apply the system 
consistently (Christchurch City Council, 1997£). 
Long term action was to focus on whether "the system needs to change?" 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997f, p. 3). If so, what was the system to achieve and 
how much change was appropriate? 
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Remuneration members resolved that interim action should: 
i) address the four issues identified during meeting six; 
• pay was not based on performance. 
• there was a lack of clarity on how merit steps were earned. 
• the system was dependent on the effort made by managers. 
• Managers did not know how to apply the system consistently. 
ii) improve the criteria for merit steps and tie this to Personal Value Plans; 
iii) communicate the system to raise understanding. 
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Each member of the remuneration team was responsible for researching solutions to 
the four issues identified by the team. Three members of the remuneration team were 
given the task of focussing on a sub-set of performance management. Their 
assignment was to concentrate on rewards and reward strategies, in particular, to 
develop a link between Personal Value Plans and pay. 
3.1.1. Linking Personal Value Plan and Remuneration 
Two meetings were· held to determine how to link the Personal Value Plan and 
remuneration. Prior to the first meeting each member considered how to adapt the 
Unit's remuneration system. At the first meeting, one member presented a diagram 
depicting the current review system (Figure 5-5, page 76) and a proposed system that 
he had drafted (Figure 5-6, page 76). 
Within the current system, targets and competencies were reviewed every six months 
at Persdnal Value Plan meetings and did not directly affect the remuneration of an 
employee. However, it was noted that ''pe1formance against targets could indirectly 
affect an employee meeting their merit step criteria". 
The proposed review format was to be based on the achievement of outputs. The 
outputs were to be aligned with the CCC Business Plan, Unit Value Plan and Team 
Value Plan. Taking this approach to setting goals in a pay for performance system is 
recommended as a method to ensure goal congruence (Dyment, 1987; Kinnie and 
Lowe, 1990; Meehan, 1992; Minken, 1987; Romanoff, 1989; Sink and Sahl, 1995). 
Three types of outputs were suggested: 
i) Core outputs were the "things you are supposed to do, the key functions 
of your role". Core outputs would be taken from your job description and 
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would encompass the provision of service activities. 5-6 core outputs 
were recommended. 
Figure 5-5 - Current Review Format 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997g, p. 1) 
Targets 








Figure 5-6 - Proposed Review Format 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997g, p. 1) 
Outputs 
Meets 
I I I 
I I I 






1. Staff member is not meeting required performance standard. 
Is being assisted by supervisor/manager for ability or other reasons. 
2. Staff member is meeting expected output requirements 
Staff member is meeting expected outputs on the following basis: 
3. occasional basis 
4. regular basis 
5. always 
ii) Improvement outputs included "personal and other improvement areas 
required to improve overall performance" (Christchurch City Council, 
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1997 g, p. 1 ). These relate to "continuous· improvement and Human 
Resource issues" (Christchurch City Council, 1996/97, p. 5). 2-3 
improvement outputs were recommended. 
iii) Project outputs were "new initiatives and improvements required to give 
improvement in the core output area. They also [included] one off 
projects for the "Overall Good" " (Christchurch City Council, 1997g, 
p. 1). Attendance on teams, such as the remuneration team, may be a 
project output. 2-3 project outputs were recomm~mded. 
Approximately 21 competencies were recommended. These included aspects of 
individual's personality such as integrity, innovation and commitment. 
Competencies were considered: 
"essential for use in determining, obtaining and rating core and project 
outputs. All competencies [were] included within the core and project 
output areas and [were] necessary for these outputs to be met for merit 
consideration" (Christchurch City Council, 1997g, p. 1). 
The nine to twelve outputs and 21 competencies included in the proposed review 
would vary from position to position. An employee would be rated on individual 
outputs or competencies according to the proposed format (Figure 5-6, page 76). 
Each rating category49 is assigned a percentage weighting and this would be used to 
determine the final rating for an employee. There should not be too many outputs, or 
objectives, for employees or they will be unsure of an organisation's priorities 
(Macautay and Cook, 1994). As the outputs of the proposed system were split into 
categories, it would be easier for an employee to determine priorities. 
The competencies were to be used as one measure of an employee's performance. 
Romanoff (1989) believes the use of personality traits as a measure of performance 
assumes that the traits are synonymous with success and are able to be changed 
easily, whereas this is not the case. They are, therefore, not a good measure of 
performance. The subjective nature of these types of measures are often an issue 
with unions and employees (Lowery et al., 1996). 
The proposed system was discussed and modified until consensus was reached by the 
49 A category may be an output (core, improvement or project) or a competency. 
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three members responsible for this project (Figure 5-7, page 78). The main 
difference to the second proposal was each output was weighted to indicate the 
importance of that item. The total of the grades was to equal 1.0. The final 
performance rating would "determine the level of merit entitlement" (Christchurch 
City Council, 1997h, p. 1 ). 
The weighting of objectives is an excellent way to ensure that the organisation's 
priorities are understood by employees (Geske, 1989, Sink and Sahl, 1995). The use 
of the term 'entitlement' when referring to the level of performance payment is 
unusual, particularly when the team was striving to design a system that would not be 
seen as an entitlement, but rather a payment that was dependant on performance. 
When a performance payment is viewed as an entitlement the link between pay and 
performance is not reinforced (Meehan, 1992). 
Figure 5-7 - Proposed Link to Merit Increase - An Example 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997h, p. 2) 
Score: (2.3 x 0.2) + (3.4 x 0.1) + (2.0 x 0.1) + (4.0 x 0.4) + (2.0 x 0.2) = 3.0 
Overall Performance Grade is 3.0 
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The consensus by the three project members, on the proposed system, was subject to 
adequate clarification on a number of issues: 
i) Should the merit increase apply only to base salary (ie 100% )? If not, the 
staff at 110% would receive a higher bonus whether it was deserved or 
not. 
ii) Should the merit increase be applied as a percentage of salary or a lump 
sum50 per employee? 
iii) Who would control the system? It was felt that this would be at the 
discretion of the Section Manager. It was noted "a well controlled and 
operated system should give a normal distribution of staff between 2 and 
5 on the performance rating scale" (Christchurch City Council, l 997h, 
p 1). 
iv) Should the system be initially trialed without a link to remuneration? 
Members recognised that the Unit could "use the continuous 
improvement approach of graphing the distribution of performance scores 
so staff [could] see where they fit". It was further noted that "this should 
give time to improve any problems before it hurts" (Christchurch City 
Council, 1997h, p. 2). 
v) The initial set-up and subsequent ranking of the outputs was vital to "the 
performance of the system". It was recognised that investment in terms of 
time and effort was required to ensure a system that promoted goal 
congruence throughout the Unit (Christchurch City Council, 1997h, p. 2). 
vi) It was anticipated that the development scale of 90 - 100 %, within the 
Salaried Staff Collective Contract, would fit onto this rating system and 
allow for assessment. How this was to occur was not specified. 
These issues raised by the members of the project team, reflect an awareness of many 
important aspects of designing a pay for performance system. This was evidenced by 
the suggestion that the new system initially run without a link to pay. This would 
increase the employees' understanding and acceptance of the system and enable 
50 A lump sum payment is given to employees in lieu of an increase in salary (Harris, 1996). This does not become part of base 
salary (Perry, 1988). 
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problems to be identified. Ensuring the system runs smoothly before it is linked to 
remuneration is a strategy recommended when developing the most equitable system 
.. 
(Flannery et al., 1996). This will also allow time to nurture the culture necessary for 
the plan to achieve its objectives (Flannery et al., 1996). 
The major problem members were presented with when designing a new system was 
the existing salary structure. Employees throughout the organisation could be at 
different levels on the salary scale (90-110% for those staff under the Salaried 
Collective Contract). This may be due to the length of employment rather than the 
performance of the employee in their role. A change to salary structures would entail 
lengthly negotiations with union representatives from five different unions. The 
magnitude of this change meant that this option was not seriously considered by the 
remuneration team. 
Utilising a forced distribution system51 was another option under consideration. 
When determining the most suitable form of reward for the Business Unit, a few . 
options were considered. The 'cafeteria' plans52 noted in Chapter 2 were identified as 
an option, along with merit increases from 100% to 110% and a lump sum bonus for 
employees. Intrinsic rewards were already utilised within the CCC. 'Bouquets' were 
given to employees that had made a difference within the organisation. The bouquet 
may be, for example, movie tickets, dinner vouchers or flowers. 
At this point. in the design process, the members of this project team resolved to take 
the second proposal (as noted in Figure 5-7, page 78), with the accompanying issues, 
to the remuneration team for discussion and agreement before any further 
developments were made. Business Unit A reached this point in the design of their 
pay for performance system.in November 1997. In late November a meeting was 
scheduled to determine how Personal Value Plans may need to be changed, to decide 
how the system was to work and to discuss progress made by the three team 
members responsible for developing a link between Personal Value Plan and 
remuneration (Christchurch City Council, 1997i). 
51 A forced distribution system restricts "the percentage of employees who can be assigned a rating" (Meehan, 1992, p. 48). 
52 A cafeteria system allows employees to choose from a 'menu' of benefits (Hodge, 1998). 
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During this process of design, a number of advantages and disadvantages were 
identified. These factors concerned both pay for performance in general and the 
process undertaken by Business Unit A. 
3.2.Advantages of the Design Process 
Responses from members of the remuneration team when defining pay for 
performance demonstrated an appreciation of the advantages of pay for performance 
systems and the process foiiowed by Business Unit A. MeP1bers beiieved a pay for 
performance system would prompt favourable consequences in a number of areas. 
Remuneration team members recognised that a pay for performance system could 
prompt employees to focus on the CCC's goals (Christchurch City Council, 1997c). 
The strategic objectives would be brought to the attention of those who had the 
ability to influence its success (Geske, 1989; Laabs, 1996; Pederson and Lidgerding, 
1995). 
It was noted that a' pay for performance system would save the CCC money. 
Conversely employees would have the opportunity to earn more. Flexibility in 
compensation costs is often considered an advantage of introducing a pay for 
performance system (Gandossy and Scheffel, 1995; Rich and Florin-Thuma, 1990; 
Turner, 1996). However, members of the remuneration team did not mention that the 
CCC's compensation costs could also increase when the performance improved . 
. 
Respondents believed the introduction of a pay for performance system would 
improve organisation and individual performance. Employees who were "coasting53 " 
would now have to work harder, thus removing several inequities currently found in 
the system (Christchurch City Council, 1997c, p. 3). Employees not performing 
would be identified and dealt with appropriately. The cultural change that often 
accompanies the introduction of a pay for performance system contributes to the 
improvement of performance (Ross, 1988). 
There was a strong focus on how a new system would affect employees. Members 
believed the addition of pay for performance would provide employees with an 
53 "Coasting" refers to employees that expend minimal effort when performing their duties. 
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incentive to remain with the CCC. Furthermore, employees would be more motivated 
and satisfied with their jobs. Increased employee retention is often viewed as an 
.. 
advantage of introducing a pay for performance system (Banker et al., 1996; Geske, 
1989; McGinty and Hanke, 1989; Ross, 1988). 
The main advantages outlined in Chapter 2 were identified by members of the 
remuneration team, reflecting an awareness of what an ideal pay for performance 
system could achieve. When asked to describe the advantages of Business Unit A's 
design process, additional advantages were identified. The devoiution of authority to 
the individual Business Units was singled out as having particular value: 
"The Council covers a wide range of industries (eg roading, rubbish 
collection, promotions and marketing, parks, technical services). Because 
of this there are many different needs within the Council. Looking at what 
suits each Unit acknowledges this difference"; 
"It recognises that Units may be at different stages of development and may 
wish to change at different paces"; 
"It enables the Units to work through the issues as they are ready to face 
them". 
It is recognised that different positions within an organisation should have objectives 
and measures customised to suit their unique nature (Cumming, 1988). Furthermore, 
different sections within an organisation may be at varying stages of "cultural 
readiness" for pay for performance (Gross and Bacher, 1993, p. 53). The readiness 
of a Unit for a new compensation system is a determining factor in its eventual 
success (Gross and Bacher, 1993). Decentralising compensation decisions is a new 
process that is compatible with the move towards flatter organisational structures 
(Smith, 1992). A corporate-wide system would not provide the same benefits to the 
Business Unit and would work against the culture that was being cultivated within 
the organisation. As one interviewee noted: 
"Units believe that they know their own business best. If a corporate .!Jystem 
was determined and given to all workers, it would undermine the culture 
that has been built up". 
Members of the remuneration team believed designing a plan at Unit level would 
increase the level of commitment and acceptance of a plan: 
"It gives flexibility to the Business Units and empowers them; 
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"There is more commitment to a system initiated at Unit level rather than at 
corporate level". 
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Involving employees in the design of a new compensation increases the acceptance 
and understanding of the plan (Cumming, 1988). Furthermore, employees take 
ownership of the system when they have been involved in the design. Involving 
employees in the design of Business Unit A's design meant: 
"Units were encouraged to take ownership of their problems, and they form 
a culture of leadership. Taking ownership of the process means ownership 
of the successes and failures ",· 
"People are encouraged to challenge poor pe1formance, and feedback is 
encouraged at all levels"; 
"If it is done properly then it will be a good thing. It will lift morale and get 
people to perform better. But it is part of a package, if they are rewarded 
better, and are still treated badly, then the benefits will not be forthcoming". 
However, when questioned as to the advantages of Business Unit A's approach to 
designing its pay for performance system, the response from one interviewee was 
"none". In clarifying this response, the interviewee noted a number of 
disadvantages. These disadvantages, along with other responses, are included in the 
next section. 
3.3.Disadvantages of the Design Process 
Disadvantages that were expressed related to pay for performance in general and 
Business Unit A's approach. There was an awareness that pay for performance on its 
own would not work, it had to be coupled with sound management and goal setting 
(Giblin and Kelley, 1994). However, members of the remuneration team did 
question whether pay for performance was necessary: 
"If goals are clearly defined then you don't need to wony about pay for 
. .(, " pe1Jormance ,· 
"If you have performance management that is objective then that is ideal. It 
all co.n1es down to management technique and style. If you can manage well 
then you can convince people that what they are doing is worthwhile 
[without pay for performance]". 
"Is it worth the effort?" (Christchurch City Council, 1997c, p. 4). 
"For the already performing, is it a farce?" (Christchurch City Council, 
1997c, p. 4). 
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There was a concern that the move towards pay for performance was merely a 
method of reducing wage costs, that people were going to "lose money" 
.. 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997c, p. 4): 
"If the drive is for dollars, then this usually means that you get rid of 
people, as wages is generally the only variable cost that the manager can 
really influence. This usually happens before new systems are in place, and 
it puts more stress on the existing people. It is a vicious circle''. 
Behavioural consequences to the pay for performance system were of concern to 
members of the remuneration team. The system could "promote tall poppy 
behaviour [and] divide a team" (Christchurch City Council, 1997c, p. 4). Jealousy 
between employees would increase and people would guard their ideas rather than 
share them with their Section (Christchurch City Council, 1997c). Further, what 
would the "impact [be] on self-esteem if no bonus [was] received?" (Christchurch 
City Council, 1997c, p. 1). 
These concerns are also reflected in the literature. When pay for performance 
systems are introduced teamwork is diminished as employees are working against 
each other rather than together towards common goals (Deming, 1986; Kohn, 1993; 
Parnell, 1991). 
Many concerns with pay for performance systems stem from the performance 
management process: goal setting, performance measurement and performance 
appraisal (~rough, 1994; Deming, 1986; Meehan, 1992). Remuneration team 
members were also concerned with goal setting. Would the most appropriate 
objectives be set? "Are we paying people for something they should be doing?" 
(Christchurch City Council, 1997c, p. 4). 
Performance measurement is a particular problem within the public sector, for there 
is no profit motive to benchmark performance (Wisdom and Patzig, 1987). 
Fmihermore, many public sector organisations operate in the service sector where 
choosing meaningful performance measures poses a particular challenge (Wisdom 
and Patzig, 1987): 
"When you have pay for performance, if the manager assessing you is not 
working "on the job" you can 't see the real performance, and it has to be 
measured subjectively". 
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"How [do you] measure people in [a] backroom job?" (Christchurch City 
Council, 1997c, p. 4). 
"How do you value cost reduction?" (Christchurch City Council, l 997c, 
p. 4). 
85 
Interviewees also expressed concerns regarding the performance appraisal process, in 
particular the manager's lack of objectivity when appraising employees: 
"There could be potential personality clashes between the person that sets 
targets and the person who must achieve them''. 
"[Managers will be] too scared to say "no you don't get' it" " (Christchurch 
City Council, 1997c, p. 4). 
The connection between pay and performance is often damaged by managers 
(Lawler, 1981 ). Objectivity and consistency do not exist when a manager 1s 
evaluating their employees, bias is inevitable (Wilkerson, 1995). 
It is important to target those that can influence an organisation's performance, or the 
scheme may become too expensive to sustain (Anonymous, 1988). However, 
including all employ~es in a pay for performance plan may be a strategic objective, 
for instance, to promote cultural change. Only one interviewee mentioned any 
concern about implementing a system for all staff within Business Unit A. This 
employee felt: 
"one system for all staff within the Unit will be difficult. Staff includes top 
management to farm labourers. It would be hard to set targets that are 
genuine enough for farm labourers''. . 
Furthermore, companies that are committed to business unit autonomy would benefit 
from decentralising compensation decisions (Smith, 1992). 
There was no mention of any negative union reaction to the move to pay for 
performance. Conversely the reaction from the Amalgamated Workers Union54 had 
been positive. Although this was ''probably because [the remuneration team was] 
looking more at bonus schemes rather than the substitution of base pay rates". 
Generally when pay is related to performance, the unions are unable to influence 
wage increases, as they are based on performance (Proctor et al., 1993). However, 
54 
The Amalgamated Workers Union is a bargaining agent for the Outside Staff Collective Employment Contract. 
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the system proposed by Business Unit A did not place the base salary at risk. 
Employees would either earn an incentive on top of their salary, or their income 
would remain the same. For this reason, it is not surprising that the unions did not 
object to the proposed system. 
A union was approached to join a working pmiy to design another Business Unit's 
pay for performance system. The union did not want to join the process as they 
were: 
"concerned that their involvement could compromise the workers' interests. 
However it was explained that even if they got to the end of the design 
process and they were not happy with the system then it did not mean that 
they had to accept it". 
Acceptance of a pay for performance plan by the Unions was viewed as imperative. 
A major objection of unions, is once a pay for performance system is introduced they 
can be isolated or removed from pay negotiations (O'Connor, 1994). The CCC was 
not looking to remove the.unions from the pay process, and recognised: 
"if the union was not happy with the design then it would not have achieved 
the objective of the pay for performance system anyway". 
Disadvantages with Business Unit A's approach to design also involved concerns 
about the equitability of the scheme and the process that was followed. Initially there 
was some confusion about what was involved in designing a system: 
"The. whole process was not explained from the start, and what was 
involved changed significantly when [the human resources representative] 
came along". 
While there were a number of advantages of having each Business Unit designing 
their own remuneration system, interviewees also mentioned the following 
disadvantages: 
"There is some question as to the long term equitability of the schemes. 
[Employees] want a common link between the Units"; 
"There is the potential for fragmentation and the long term costs are not 
known"; 
"Is anything being implemented at all? lf the Units can go at their own 
pace there is the facility for nothing to occur"; 
"This [part of the Unit] does not have its goals well de.fined, and unless that 
is de.fined it is hard to de.fine anything else". 
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Should managers within the Business Units of the CCC not have clear responsibility 
for the expenses in their Unit, then the more traditional approach to remuneration 
would be more appropriate (Smith, 1992). Empowering Business Units in the area of 
remuneration is an area where there has been little guidance in the literature. It 
represents an approach that moves the human resource functions back its traditional 
support role (Smith, 1992). Further research into delegation of remuneration 
decisions to Business Units is needed. 
There was also some concern regarding the direction of the design process: 
"People in the teams want more direction and perhaps some corporate 
guidelines". 
The amount of time the remuneration meetings took was an issue with team 
members. Responses were mixed on this point, as some respondents believed this 
was necessary in order to properly consider the relevant issues: 
"It wastes time"; 
"It is time consuming, and we have not yet reached a conclusion that can be 
put in place, and are a long way off a financial reward system"; 
"It is going a little slowly, but it is not something that you should rush into",· 
"It is taking quite a bit of time, but it is worthwhile. If it is not done 
properly then it could have an adverse effect". 
Other comments centered around administrative problems: 
"There has not been regular attendance at the meetings which creates 
continuity problems",· 
"The meeting rooms are awkward, too small for the number of people"; 
"We don't get the minutes/results/summaries of the meeting until the next 
meeting"; 
"We go in cold to meetings. As it is an important issue, if I was able to 
prepare for the meetings, I could then provide better responses". 
The disadvantages and advantages identified by remuneration team members, 
influenced the decisions made when designing the pay for performance system. In 
order to investigate the full design process undertaken by Business Unit A, a second 
phase of research was conducted. 
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3.4.0ne Year Later ... 
In Oc.tober 1998 the site was revisited. The objective of this phase of the research 
was to ascertain the Business Unit's progress following the last contact by the 
researcher. When asked of the developments made by the Business Unit in designing 
and implementing their pay for performance system, the response was: 
"Nothing, absolutely nothing!"; 
"Nothing has really happened since we last spoke with you"; , 
"It just died". 
The meeting scheduled for the end of November 1997: 
"just never happened It was put off until after Christmas, and 'after 
Christmas' never arrived", 
There were a number of reasons posited for the lack of advancement. Firstly, there 
was recognition that the Business Unit was not ready to implement pay for 
performance for individual employees. There needed to be changes to the existing 
salary structure: 
"It was difficult to go forward with the pay system that we have at the 
moment. There needs to be changes to the salary structure first"; 
"I think we realised that there is significant work required, and that further 
development was critical", 
Personal Value Planning needed to be reworked before it could be successfully 
linked to remuneration. 
There was also recognition of the difficulties involved m selecting appropriate 
performance measures: 
"We need to go back a step and look at Personal Value Plans, If they are 
not right, then the system will be fraught with measurement problems and 
inequities",· 
"There ne.eded to be more work on the Personal Value Plans, there was a 
lack of tangible, robust measures, The language was too aily fairy and the 
measures were therefore difficult to quantify". 
As noted in Chapter 2, major criticisms stem from problems with performance 
measurement and goal setting. Performance measures in the public sector pose 
particular problems due to the lack of profit motive and the inherent difficulties 
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determining performance measures for service organisations (Wisdom and Patzig, 
1987) . 
.. 
Secondly, it was posited the process may have stalled due to external pressures and 
unce1iainty faced by the Business Unit: 
"The rate of change over the last year has increased, Units are facing a lot 
of external pressures ... the Unit probably wants to see how the changes will 
affect them. Until then the Unit won't want to rock the boat". 
It was possible that several Units within the CCC coui.d be turned into Local 
Authority Trading Enterprises (LATEs). If this was to happen then the Units would 
become new organisations and would, therefore, employ staff on new contracts. In 
an unstable environment the redesign of compensation systems will not be a high 
priority for management (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991). This supports the 
assertion that organisations place different priorities on compensation decisions when 
they are at different stages of their lifecycle (Stewart, 1993). Further internal and 
external factors mus~ work together to create a suitable environment for pay for 
performance to work equitably (Dulling, 1996). 
A third explanation was provided by two respondents who believed the development 
of a new system had been ''put into the too hard basket". Further, it was suggested 
"the Unit Manager lost interest". This statement provides indirect support for the 
argument that a zealot driving a pay for performance system will strongly influence 
its even.tual success (Gandossy and Scheffel, 1995). In this situation the lack of 
strong leadership has meant development of a new system has stalled. 
Finally, it was suggested there "were mutterings about reward and recognition on a 
Corporate basis". Upon fmiher investigation it was found there was not going to be 
a corporate led reward 'and recognition strategy. However, it was recognised the 
CCC needed to "look at the remuneration processes that can be altered and 
transferred to suit other Units". The CCC wanted to provide the correct 
environment for pay for performance, but did not want to stipulate the remuneration 
system for each Unit, as this would be an unpopular move. As one interviewee 
noted, "c01porate edicts go down fairly fl at". 
The CCC decided to ''provide the fiwnework for performance management through 
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updating job descriptions, Job Value Statements and addressing poor performance". 
In mid 1998, the CCC commenced a three module training programme. Each 
.. 
module was targeted at improving performance management in the organisation. 
The modules were: 
i) Job Value Statements; 
ii) Performance Value Planning; and 
iii) Dealing with poor performance. 
In line with the corporate philosophy, Units were able to address the Job Value 
Statements and Performance Value Plans at their own pace: 
"The changes to the Personal Value Plans and Job Value Statements were 
not a corporate edict. Each Unit is able to move through the statements and 
make changes as they are ready. The changes have been incremental"; 
"The reason for this is that the Units are at different states of readiness, and 
are facing different environments". 
This statement provides ~upport for the argument that the "cultural readiness" of a 
Unit or organisation is an important consideration when designing a pay for 
performance plan (Gross and Bacher, 1993, p. 53). It was further noted: 
"The approach to reward and recognition will be, where possible, similar 
(although this will be subject to the collective contract)". 
In October 1998, a member of the Human Resources Department met with a 
Remuneration Consultant. It was envisioned that this consultant would, in 
conjunction with a Human Resources representative, be an aid to the Business Units. 
The consultant could "drive the process". 
At the completion of this research Business Unit A had not completed the design of 
their pay for performance system. This in itself did not necessarily mean that the 
team had failed in its objective to design an appropriate system. However, as there 
was no formal conclusion to the design process it is difficult to say that with 
certainty. It is possible that the design process stalled because of a recognition that 
the environment faced by the Unit did not support the introduction of a pay for 
performance plan at that time. However, if the process was hindered by the lack of 
drive and expertise this raises very different issues. A discussion of the process 
undertaken by the Unit in conjunction with the literature follows in the next section. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
While members of the remuneration team in Business Unit A were not experts in the 
Human Resource field and had not completed the introduction of a new pay for 
performance system, they showed an awareness of many important issues within the 
literature. The comprehension of these issues was largely due to the influence of the 
Human Resources facilitator, who shaped the remuneration team's decision to widen 
the process from one of designing a pay for performance system, to designing and 
refining the performance management system. The procedure followed by Business 
Unit A supported the direction suggested in the literature, with a few interesting 
exceptions. 
The nature of the pay for performance system preferred by Business Unit A, Personal 
Value Plan, meant the incentive plan would be unique for each employee. Custom-
designing reward systems is necessary because a universal plan can not meet the 
needs of all sectors of an organisation (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991 ), nor can it suit 
all positions within an organisation (Cumming, 1988). However, allowing Business 
Units to design their own remuneration systems is a very new phenomenon, that has 
not been widely reported in the literature. The implications of taking this approach 
was explored. This topic warrants further investigation. 
Public sector organisations are often faced with many changes occurring 
simultnneously within their organisation, and the CCC is no exception (Brough, . 
1994). The nature of public sector organisations has meant that they generally have 
more work to do, than private sector organisations, to become responsive to their 
environment (Brough, 1994). Organisations are advised to integrate their change in 
compensation with other change initiatives and to develop a comprehensive change 
strategy (Bunyan and McGill, 1997; Flannery et al., 1996). Business Unit A's 
individual approach to remuneration was supported by initiatives such as Job Value 
Statements, Personal Value Plans and the training modules commenced by the CCC 
in 1998. Performance management also featured strongly within the CCC. Although 
Job Value Statements and Personal Value Plans were relatively new concepts within 
the organisation, they seem to have been embraced by Business Unit A. Members 
recognised the crucial role of goals and performance measurement within these plans. 
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The outputs of the Business Unit were the foundation of the proposed compensation 
plan. However, determining the appropriate outputs for Business Unit A and their 
employees was outside the scope of the design process and was addressed at training 
sessions during 1998. 
At the inception of the remuneration meetings, Business Unit A agreed on a process 
diagram to drive the development of their pay for performance system. The first step 
was to decide on the objectives of the Business Unit. Following this, barriers to 
achieving those objectives were identified. These barriers were divided into two 
categories: internal and external factors. Identification of these factors enables an 
organisation to ascertain the changes necessary to ensure the maximum effectiveness 
of a new remuneration system (Dulling, 1996). Business Unit A took an alternative 
approach by identifying barriers to meeting Unit objectives. This resulted in the 
identification of pertinent internal and external factors. 
One obstacle to the design process that was not initially acknowledged by members . 
of the remuneration team, was the existing salary structure. Aside from the salary 
structure element to design, the remaining internal factors recognised by Business 
Unit A were more specific than those in the literature, and included issues 
predominantly related to performance management. The broader issues of culture 
and life cycle of the organisation were not addressed by the Business Unit. The 
specific issues identified by Business Unit A were tasks that the Business Unit was 
anticipating ·carrying out. It is unlikely that Business Unit A would endeavour to 
revamp the existing salary structure. This is a major problem to the Business Unit as 
the existing salary structure posed the greatest barrier to the design of a new system. 
Following identification of t~ese barriers, Business Unit A decided on the objectives 
for their new remuneration system. When objectives are agreed prior to design, 
organisations are able to structure the design of their system to make it more likely 
that their objectives are achieved (McAdams and Hawk, 1993). Business Unit A's 
objectives for developing a pay for performance system were consistent with those 
listed in Chapter 2. However, the Unit did not refer to the purpose of aligning their 
compensation to the organisation's cost structure (Giblin and Kelley, 1994) and 
recruiting employees to fit the organisation's culture (Lederer and Weinberg, 1996; 
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Mandt, 1984). This result was unexpected as the financial aspects of pay for 
performance are often the most compelling in this competitive environment (Giblin 
and Kelley, 1994). The objective to achieve agreement on output results was 
unusual. Pay for perfonnance would not solve the problems with goal setting and 
performance measurement, rather it is reliant on clarity in this area. Perhaps the 
intention was to prompt more work in the performance management area before pay 
for performance was introduced. 
Having identified the objectives, the next step in the process was to determine the 
type of pay for performance system that would best suit Business Unit A. There was 
the possibility at this stage, that the Unit would decide that the barriers to 
performance should be reduced and the design process put on hold. Different types 
of pay for performance systems were introduced briefly to remuneration team 
members. However, members did not mention the consideration of any variations to 
the original blueprint for design. The Unit may have found upon further 
investigation that a ·different type of system would be more appropriate to the 
objectives and circumstances faced by the Unit. 
The scheme proposed by Business Unit A did not stipulate the form a reward would 
take. Two options were seriously considered: provide an annual lump sum bonus; or 
a merit increase. Remuneration team members did not advise whether the option of a 
percentage bonus was considered. The culture in the CCC meant that intrinsic 
rewards; such as recognition, already played a part within the Business Unit. 
The remuneration team had not stipulated a process to follow after the decision to 
start the design of a pay for performance system. Those members of the 
remuneration team responsible for developing the link between the Personal Value 
Plan and remuneration did not receive instruction in this area. There has been little 
or no guidance in the literature to aid in the development of formal process in this 
situation. 
The decision to include all staff in the new pay for performance design was not made 
consciously by the remuneration team. Taking a strategic approach to implementing 
compensation systems was a suggestion from the corporate office. This contributed 
to all employees being involved in the pay for performance initiatives in Business 
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Unit A. Although each of the principle collective contracts were represented in 
Business Unit A, the design of the proposed system appeared to focus on the Salaried 
.. 
Staff Collective Contract. This is further evidence of the lack of guidance for 
members in the design phase of the process. As the system was intended to be 
applied to all staff within the Business Unit, the other collective contracts also 
needed to be integrated within the design. 
An issue related to performance management is forced distribution. Business Unit A 
included an indirect reference to forced distribution in the. proposed pay for 
performance system. However, members of the team did not mention any potential 
negative implications of such a move. Employing a forced distribution system may 
not support the objectives of implementing a new system. Yet, some organisations 
believe the forced distribution system is necessary in a pay for performance system 
(Smith et al., 1987). 
A pay for performance system that is funded at low levels, may induce a forced . 
distribution effect on the system (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991). Managers are 
restricted by their incentive budget and may not be able to adequately reward all 
meritorious employees (Applebaum and Shapiro, 1991). As the form of reward had 
not been settled on at the conclusion of this research it was not known whether this 
would be an issue. 
The critical ;iature of Personal Value Plans was illustrated by respondents comments 
linking the deficiencies of the plans to the suspension of the design process. The 
inherent characteristics of the public sector means that this result was not unexpected. 
Developing performance measures for public sector organisations is a difficult 
process that poses a notab~e challenge to those involved in the design process 
(Wisdom and Patzig, 1987). This is due to the absence of a profit motive and the 
difficulty in developing meaningful measures of performance for service activities 
(Wisdom and Patzig, 1987). 
The challenges of performance appraisals were also addressed by the Business Unit. 
Members of the remuneration team expressed their fear that managers may not have 
the skills, nor the will to evaluate employees equitably. Managers needed to address 
non-performance within their Business Unit and this was not happening. This area 
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was recognised as a barrier to achieving Unit objectives and is a problem within the 
area of performance appraisals (Sahl, 1994b ). In 1998 the CCC addressed these 
deficiencies in performance management by commencing three training modules. 
They were: 
i) Job Value Statements; 
ii) Performance Value Planning; and 
iii) Dealing with Poor Performance. 
Training in these three areas is strongly advised in the literature (Meehan, 1992). 
Training was crucial to the success of Business Unit A's proposed system and this 
was reflected in the reasons why the process had stalled. The lack of training on 
dealing with poor performance was a critical barrier that had to be addressed before 
significant progress was made in the design phase. 
Managers should also be trained in methods of evaluating employees and avoiding 
rating errors. While rating errors may be dealt with to some extent in the third 
training module, as 'many rating errors are unconscious rather than deliberate, a 
module that outlines the common errors and their negative effects also helps to 
reduce these mistakes (Brough, 1994; Meehan, 1992). Training in this area would be 
appropriate should a system utilising performance appraisals is introduced. 
Leadership is a crucial point when designing a new remuneration system. In this 
situation, the leader for the process was the Human Resource facilitator. . 
Management influence and support is also a critical point in the design and 
implementation of a new or revised system (Berger and Moyer, 1991; Morris, 1996; 
Kinnie and Lowe, 1990). Most often the management and leadership is provided by 
the same people (McAdams, 1995). This difference may have presented a problem 
within Business Unit A. The person who initially championed the new system had 
firm ideas about what was to be achieved, but was initially unaware of the. process 
that must be followed to ensure the system was robust. One of the reasons posited 
for the lack of advancement in the process was lack of interest fro~ this manager. 
The facilitator's role was not to drive the process, but rather provide guidance when 
requested. This was a difficult role as the facilitator was the only person with the in-
depth knowledge of designing pay for performance systems. This provides indirect 
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support for the notion that management support and forceful leadership strongly 
influence the success of a pay for performance plan. At the end of October 1998, the 
.. 
CCC decided to make a Remuneration Consultant available to the Business Units 
during their design processes. In the future, this may help provide the leadership and 
expertise needed by the Business Units when designing their remuneration systems. 
Business Unit A was aware of many of the advantages of developing and 
implementing a pay for performance system. The effect on an employees behaviour 
was noted as a major advantage to Business Unit A. Poor performance and 
outstanding performance would become apparent and would be able to be rewarded 
appropriately (Banker et al, 1996). 
The ability to retain employees within the CCC was mentioned as an advantage. 
This is supported by Banker et al. (1996) who believe organisations with pay for 
performance system attract and retain talented employees. However, team members 
did not mention the additional effects of improving the quality of the employee mix . 
(Parnell, 1991), reducing voluntary turnover (Lowery et al., 1995; Parnell, 1991), and 
decreasing absenteeism (Lowery et al., 1995; Parnell, 1991). 
Respondents referred to the flexibility that schemes can bring to an organisation, 
particularly with regard to cost savings. It is interesting to note that members of the 
remuneration team did not mention that a pay for performance system could be 
expensive f~r the organisation. This may indicate that employees view pay for 
performance schemes as a method of reducing wage costs rather than motivating 
higher performance. Further research in this area would clarify this matter. 
Business Unit A was mindful of the disadvantages that may affect their pay for 
performance system. The majority of these disadvantages revolved around the 
performance management aspects of the system. During 1998, training by the CCC 
addressed many of these, however further training would be necessary if the Unit 
decided to go further with the design and implementation of their proposed system. 
Further comments were regarding the process that was followed by the Business 
Unit. There was criticism of the initial confusion about the process they were to 
follow and related administrative matters. Should Business Unit A return to the 
design process these problems could be addressed. 
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There has been a strong emphasis on employee involvement and communication, 
however it will not be until further into the process that the benefits of this approach 
may become evident. Taking a consultative approach has meant that the design of 
the system may take longer to develop, but this was considered necessary by most 
members of the remuneration team. Throughout the design process followed by 
Business Unit A's there was a strong emphasis on consultation. All employees 
within the Unit were to be consulted once a proposed plan was in a workable form. 
If all employees of the Business Unit were advised of the d~sign earlier than this, the 
employees would have been confused by the details. This confusion would have led 
to resistance by the employees that would have been difficult to overcome (Sahl, 
1994a). 
5.SUMMARY 
Business Unit A followed a process similar to that suggested by the literature when 
designing their pay. for performance system. There were a few interesting 
exceptions. 
The Business Unit was responsible for designing their own remuneration system. 
There is a dearth of literature regarding the implications of using this approach. 
Further research into this area is needed. 
The leadership and management roles need to be clarified within the CCC. At 
present; those who would normally drive the process (i.e. the managers) do not have 
the knowledge to lead the process. 
The salary structure of the CCC presents the most difficult barrier to effective design. 
Business Unit A chose to ignore the salary structure when developing a new pay for 
performance system. A change was needed in this area, but it was viewed as too 
difficult to do. 
The design process undertaken by Business Unit A stalled at the end of 1997. This 
was not a conscious decision made by members of the remuneration team, rather the 
process stalled when a meeting was postponed and never rescheduled. It was posited 
that the design process stalled because of: 
i) Difficulties with the existing salary structure; 
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ii) Difficulties with performance measurement; 
iii) External pressures and uncertainties; and 
iv) Lack of support by management. 
Deciding not to design and implement a system for a Unit or organisation does not 
automatically mean that process has failed. It may be a recognition that the 
environment of the relevant Unit would not support the introduction of such a system 
at that time. However, as there was no formal conclusion to the design meetings, 
exactly why the process stalled is unclear. 
This chapter has reviewed the process undertaken by Business Unit A and provided 
some explanations for variances between the literature and results. These findings 
fill an gap in the literature regarding pay for performance and New Zealand 
organisations, yet some issues remain uncovered. The following chapter presents 
limitations of this research and recommends opportunities for further research in this 
field. 
Chapter 6 
Limitations and Future Research 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This research has identified a number of limitations of, and opportunities for future 
research. These are presented in this chapter. The limitations focus on the problem 
of human bias when performing case studies and problems specific to this research. 
Following the limitations are suggestions for future research. These opportunities 
have been prompted by the gaps in the current literature and the findings gained from 
Business Unit A. 
2. LIMITATIONS 
As noted in Chapter 4, there are a number of potential limitations to using the case 
study method. The principle limitation of this case study was the potential for human 
bias. The human instrument is as susceptible to mistakes as are other instruments 
(Merriam, 1998): 
"'Because the primary instrument in qualitative research is human, all 
observations and analyses are filtered through that human being's 
worldview, values and perspective" (Merriam, 1998, p. 22). 
This affects both the researcher and the respondent in various ways and illustrates the 
"complexities and limitations of the human mind" (McKinnon, 1988, p. 37). 
The presence of an interviewer may cause respondents to alter their natural responses 
to a situation or question. These are known as interviewer or observer-caused effects 
(Breakwell, .1995; McKinnon, 1988). They are often prompted by a characteristic or 
attribute of the researcher, for example, accent, dress, gender, age etc. (Breakwell, 
1995). To mitigate these effects each interview was conducted by the same 
interviewer, and the researcher was careful to dress in a manner similar to that of the 
respondents. Birnberg et al. (1990) use two classifications when describing 
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interviewer effects: demand effects and evaluation apprehension. 
i) Demand effects: An interviewee acts in a manner they believe the 
researcher desires. 
ii) Evaluation apprehension: An interviewee modifies their behaviour in 
order to impress the researcher with their knowledge, personality or other 
personal characteristics. In this situation, the respondent modifies their 
behaviour for the researcher and all others (McKinnon, 1988). 
In each situation the respondent may not be truthful and this will cause errors and 
omissions in the research (Birnberg et al., 1990; Breakwell, 1995). In addition, 
respondents may suffer from "memory decay", which will diminish the accuracy of 
the results (Brenner, 1985, p. 4; Breakwell, 1995). In this research there was only 
one reference by a respondent to any difficulty in recalling past events. Comments 
regarding the process Business Unit A followed were able to be verified through use 
of the Remuneration team minutes. 
Human biases also affect the researcher and their perceptions, and cause "observer 
bias" (McKinnon, 1988, p. 37). "[T]he distorted effects of the researcher's selective 
perception and interpretation" may bias the research findings and conclusions 
(McKinnon, 1988, p. 37). A researcher may prejudice their findings by placing too 
great an emphasis on what they 'expect' to happen, rather than what actually 
happened (Birnberg et al., 1990). 
"The researcher thus brings a construction of reality to the research 
situation, which interacts with other people's constructions or interpretations 
of the phenomenon being studied. The final product of this type of study is 
yet another interpretation by the researcher of others' views filtered through 
his or her own" (Merriam, 1998, pp. 22-23). 
The effects of human bias can be managed but not eliminated (McKinnon, 1988). 
This is a strong limitation of case studies and must be considered when 
contemplating the results. 
A second limitation of this research was the proximity of the researcher to one of the 
interviewees. This limitation must be acknowledged, however, the comments from 
this respondent did not seem biased by this relationship and appeared to be more 
candid and open. 
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Data access limitations also pose a problem in case study research. A researcher is at 
the case study site for a limited period of time and cannot observe prior events and 
practices (McKinnon, 1988). A researcher is, therefore, limited with regard to the 
historical background they are able to obtain (McKinnon, 1988). The CCC was very 
cooperative and furnished the researcher with many documents that were relevant to 
the research, including historical information. Furthermore, there were no 
restrictions placed on the researcher and the areas that were available to be 
investigated. In line with the CCC's culture, individuals were able to decide whether 
or not to participate in this research. Without exception, the respondents were 
willing and helpful when providing information, both during and, where necessary, 
after the interview. 
These limitations must be contemplated when reflecting on the results and 
conclusions advanced by this research. However, these limitations should not 
discourage researchers from unde1iaking further research in this area. 
3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has provided an in-depth description of one Business Unit's approach 
to designing their pay for performance system. A number of opportunities for future 
research exist in this area and the related field of performance management. 
A longitudinal study extending the current research into Business Unit A's 
remuneration system, would contribute the body of knowledge in this area. The 
entire development and implementation process should be reviewed. This would 
provide detailed information regarding development of goals and measures, a 
difficult area for all organisations. Investigation into the practices of another 
Business Unit within the CCC, would offer the opportunity to make comparisons 
between two Units. 
The leadership and management roles within Business Unit A's process of design 
were filled by different people. Research is needed to determine whether the 
separation of these roles will be as effective as one person taking a dual role. 
Investigation is necessary to clarify how this affects the development and 
implementation process of a pay for performance plan. 
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Business Unit A did not refer to aligning their cost structure and remuneration 
system when specifying their objectives for developing a pay for performance 
.. 
system. Further research into this area would clarify why this may be, and whether 
this is also found in other public sector organisations. 
Application of pay for performance was to occur throughout Business Unit A. 
Examination of a pay for performance system that was to only apply to a portion of 
an organisation would provide an interesting comparison. 
This research has not addressed whether the pay for performance system will work as 
intended and meet the goals of Business Unit A. Research investigating the 
effectiveness of a pay for performance system would give some insight into the 
effectiveness of the design and implementation process. 
Pay for performance systems within New Zealand organisations have not been 
widely examined. There is a dearth of case study research in this area. No obvious 
discrepancies were found between the predominantly overseas literature and the 
findings. However, it is possible that New Zealand may face difficulties peculiar to 
their economy. Additional research providing detailed descriptions and explanations 
of New Zealand practices within public and private sector organisations is therefore 
recommended. 
Public sector and private sector service organisations, face unique difficulties when 
developing and implementing their systems. Further research in this area would be 
of interest to those considering implementation or revision of their systems. 
Investigation into the development of corporate practices and guidelines within an 
organisation is suggested. This is particularly appropriate with many organisations 
delegating remuneration decisions to individual Business Units. 
Examination of these issues would further expand the base of knowledge surrounding 
pay for performance in New Zealand organisations. 
4.SUMMARY 
A major criticism of the case study method is that of human bias (McKinnon, 1988). 
These factors cannot be eliminated, but must be controlled to ensure the validity of 
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the research (McKinnon, 1988). Further limitations of this research include the 
proximity of the researcher to an interviewee and data access limitations. 
It was suggested that future research extend the pay for performance literature for 
public and private sector organisations within New Zealand. Longitudinal research 
would provide in-depth information that would be of help to managers developing 




This thesis has examined the development of a pay for performance system within a 
New Zealand public sector organisation. While Business Unit A did not complete 
the design and implementation of their pay for performance system within the time-
frame of this research, the body of knowledge in this area has been extended. 
Management accountants have been advised to broaden their research topics to 
examine issues included within this research. 
A large component of the literature, sourced predominantly from overseas journals, 
originated from consultants working in the field of human resources, and managers . 
of companies who have examined and changed their compensation systems. The 
culture of a country must be considered when developing a compensation system. 
However, there has been a dearth of research on the topic of pay for performance in a 
New Zealand context. Furthermore, there has been little empirical work 
investigating the extension of pay for performance systems to include an 
organisation's whole work-force, and the delegation of remuneration issues to . 
Business Units. The research therefore sought to investigate a pay for performance 
system within a New Zealand organisation. 
Each Business Unit within the CCC was able to address and modify their own 
compensation systems. . This aspect of design and implementation has not been 
addressed in a New Zealand context and further adds to the body of knowledge 
surrounding pay for performance. 
These points were investigated using the case study method. Fifteen interviews with 
eight people were conducted during each phase of research. Where possible 
interview data was verified through examination of documents provided by the CCC. 
However, the possibility of human bias remains and must be considered when 
contemplating the results. 
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The major obstacles to the design of Business Unit A's pay for performance system 
were problems with the Personal Value Plan and the integration of the existing 
collective contracts into a new system. The issues with the Personal Value Plan were 
being addressed, however there was no mention of any changes to the contracts 
within the CCC. 
The design process undertaken by Business Unit A stalled at the end of 1997. This 
was not a conscious decision made by members of the remuneration team, rather the 
process stalled when a meeting was postponed and never rescheduled. The Business 
Unit was also facing an uncertain environment which may have contributed to the 
process stalling. Deciding not to design and implement a system for a Unit or 
organisation does not automatically mean that process has failed. It may be a 
recognition that the environment of the Unit would not support the introduction of 
such a system at that time. 
Further study examining the design and implementation of pay for performance plans . 
in New Zealand organisations would contribute greatly to the existing body of 
literature. Public sector and service organisation would particularly benefit from 
detailed research in this area. The information these investigations would generate 
would guide organisations in the optimal design of pay for performance systems. 
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